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I. Executive Summary
The Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in
Latin America and the Caribbean (“Escazú Agreement”) is the first environmental treaty in the Americas and the
Caribbean and entered into force on April 22, 2021.
While the Escazú Agreement is a regional treaty for the Americas and the Caribbean, it is supported by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (“ECLAC”), and not the InterAmerican Human Rights System for the Protection of Human Rights (“Inter-American System”). The Escazú
Agreement is a groundbreaking treaty, both as the first in the region to enshrine regional commitments to
environmental governance as human rights obligations arising from the right to a healthy environment, 1 as well
as for its strong protections for vulnerable groups,2 with a special emphasis on State obligations to promote and
protect the activity of human rights defenders.3
The protection of human rights in the Inter-American System occurs through advocacy at the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-American Commission” or “Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (“Inter-American Court” or “Court”). Since the Escazú Agreement is not a regional Inter-American
instrument, this toolkit will explore how advocates will be able to use it for cases brought before the InterAmerican Commission and Court. It has significant potential as an important tool for advocates to continue
deepening and strengthening the protection of environmental human rights in the region.
This toolkit is intended to provide advocates with legal arguments to defend environmental human rights in the
Americas through existing norms and jurisprudence from the Inter-American System and specific provisions from
the Escazú Agreement.4 The toolkit will reflect legal arguments grounded in the rights to information,
participation, and access to justice in relation to environmental matters, as well as the substantive right to health
and a healthy environment.

1

Rollo, Alessandro, The Escazú Agreement: A Leap Forward for Environmental and Human Rights Protection in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Opinio Juris (November 03, 2021), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2021/03/11/the-escazu-agreement-a-leap-forward-forenvironmental-and-human-rights-protection-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/; see also Agreement on Access to Information, Public
Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, Preamble & art. 1, Sept. 27, 2018, available at
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43583/1/S1800428_en.pdf. [hereinafter Escazú Agreement].
2 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at Preamble & arts. 4.5, 5.3-4, 6.6, 7.14, 8.5, 10.2(e).
3 Secretary General’s message marking the Entry into Force of the Escazú Agreement, U.N. April 22, 2021, available at
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2021-04-22/secretary-generals-message-marking-the-entry-force-of-theescaz%C3%BA-agreement; see also Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at Preamble and art. 9.
4 The material in the toolkit assumes that the reader is familiar with the Inter-American System and its mechanisms. For readers looking
for an introduction to the Inter-American System, please review the helpful resources provided by the International Justice Resource
Center, available at https://ijrcenter.org/regional/inter-american-system/.
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II. Introduction: Advocates Can Use the Escazú Agreement to Deepen the
Existing Inter-American Normative Framework on Human Rights and the
Environment
A. What is the Escazú Agreement and How Will It Be Implemented?
The Escazú Agreement is a new regional environmental human rights treaty that entered into force on April 22,
2021.5 It is a UN regional treaty adopted by the ECLAC, and ratification is open to the 33 Latin American and
Caribbean ECLAC member States.6 Although ECLAC is a UN body, the Escazú Agreement cannot apply to
non-ECLAC member States,7 and the negotiating parties took care to adapt its provisions to the specific regional
context of Latin America and the Caribbean.8
The substantive content of the Escazú Agreement reflects the crisis of human rights violations related to
environmental harm and climate change facing vulnerable communities and human rights defenders in the
region.9 The treaty is grounded in the human right to a healthy environment10 and seeks to implement Principle
10 of the Rio Declaration on environmental access rights by enshrining the complementary procedural rights to
information, participation, and access to justice.11
Given the importance of the treaty’s content, implementation will be a key priority for advocates. The agreement
allows for a regular Conference of the Parties12 and creates the “Committee to Support Implementation and
Compliance,” with the mandate of promoting implementation of the treaty, 13 which mirrors the implementation
mechanism for the only other regional environmental access rights treaty, Europe’s Aarhus Convention.14 As
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Escazú Agreement Enters into Force in Latin America and the Caribbean
on International Mother Earth Day” (April 22, 2021), available at https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/escazu-agreement-enters-forcelatin-america-and-caribbean-international-mother-earth.
6 See ECLAC Observatory on Principle 10 in Latin America and the Caribbean, Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public
Participation
and
Justice
in
Environmental
Matters
in
Latin
America
and
the
Caribbean,
available
at
https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/treaties/regional-agreement-access-information-public-participation-and-justice-environmental.
[hereinafter ECLAC Information, Participation, and Justice].
7 Id.
8 See ECLAC, Negotiating Committee Road Map for the Formulation of an Instrument on the Application of Principle 10 in Latin America
and
the
Caribbean,
available
at
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38728/S2012855_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; see also Escazú, supra note 1,
at Preface and Preamble.
9 Escazú Agreement,supra note 1, at Preface and Preamble; Universal Rights Group Geneva, The Escazú Agreement: A landmark
regional treaty for environmental defenders, available at https://www.universal-rights.org/contemporary-and-emerging-human-rightsissues/the-escazu-agreement-a-landmark-regional-treaty-for-environmental-defenders/.
10 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 4.
11 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at Preface and Preamble; ECLAC Observatory on Principle 10 in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Principle
10
of
the
Rio
Declaration
on
Environment
and
Development,
available
at
https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/en/infographics/principle-10-rio-declaration-environment-and-development.
12 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 15; note that the first Conference of the Parties was concluded in April 2022, with upcoming
sessions planned for April 2023 and April 2024, see ECLAC, Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Reaffirm the Escazú
Agreement as a Fundamental Tool for Ensuring a Healthy Environment for Present and Future Generations, April 22, 2022, available at
https://acuerdodeescazu.cepal.org/cop1/en/news/countries-latin-america-and-caribbean-reaffirm-escazu-agreement-fundamental-toolensuring?utm_source=cepal-news&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cepal_news_april_2022.
13 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 18(1).
14 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 15, June 25, 1998, available at https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf;
Panovics, Attila. The Escazú Agreement and the Protection of Environmental Human Rights Defenders. Pecs Journal of International
and European Law, 2021/I., p. 27, available at https://ceere.eu/pjiel/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pjiel-2021-1-attila-panovics.pdf; The
Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment, Implementing the Escazú Agreement: the need for rapid definition of the
Committee to Support Implementation and Compliance, Aug. 17, 2021, available at https://gnhre.org/community/implementing-theescazu-agreement-the-need-for-rapid-definition-of-the-committee-to-support-implementation-and-compliance/.
5
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described in Article 18 of the Escazú Agreement, the Compliance Committee has a consultative role and is “nonadversarial, non-judicial and non-punitive.”15
The treaty further specifies that the Committee’s work must be undertaken with “the significant participation of
the public and paying particular attention to the national capacities and circumstances of the Parties.” 16 At the
time of writing, the Compliance Committee had not yet been fully formed, although the Parties adopted a
proposed draft of the Rules of Governing the Structure and Functions of the Committee to Support
Implementation and Compliance with the Escazú Agreement during the first Conference of the Parties in April
2022.17 These rules contemplate an individual complaint mechanism whereby the Committee could receive
reports of non-compliance and issue observations and recommendations.18 The possibility of creating a special
rapporteurship to monitor implementation and mediate disputes has also been raised. 19 Though these early
developments indicate some political will to support effective implementation and enforcement, it will take several
years for them to be realized, and for the treaty to meet its full potential, civil society engagement with this
Committee, and advocacy for additional ratifications.20 Implementation measures will be critical.21
B. Can Advocates Enforce the Escazú Agreement through the Inter-American System?
As these implementation mechanisms develop, advocates have another, more immediately available, pathway
to seek enforcement of the human rights principles underlying the agreement: the Inter-American System.
Because the Escazú Agreement was adopted by the ECLAC rather than the Organization of American States
(“OAS”), it is not directly enforceable before the Inter-American System.22 As Inter-American bodies, the
Commission and Court only have jurisdiction over Inter-American human rights treaties adopted by the OAS. 23
The Inter-American Commission and Court have developed a consistent practice of looking to external sources
of law to interpret State obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights (“American Convention”)
and other Inter-American human rights treaties.24 Accordingly, the Commission and Court have the interpretive
15

Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 18 (1).
Id. at 18(2); see also ECLAC Participation and Justice, supra note 6, at 165-66.
17 ECLAC, Decisions Adopted at the First Conference of the Parties, Decision I/3: Rules Relating to the Structure and Functions of the
Committee
to
Support
Implementation
and
Compliance,
April
22,
2022,
pp.
17-25,
available
at
https://acuerdodeescazu.cepal.org/cop1/sites/acuerdodeescazucop1/files/22-00344_cop-ez.1_decisions_approved_4_may.pdf
[hereinafter Decision I/3]; see also ECLAC, Revised Proposal on the Rules Relating to the Structure and Functions of the Committee to
Support
Implementation
and
Compliance,
LC/COP-EZ.1/DDR/2,
March
22,
2022,
available
at
https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/48347-rules-relating-structure-and-functions-committee-support-implementation-and
;
Recommendations of the Public (“Civil Society”), Proposals on Elements to be Considered in the Rules Governing the Structure and
Functions
of
the
Committee
to
Support
Implementation
and
Compliance,
(“Proposed
Rules”)
https://accessinitiative.org/sites/default/files/english_10.6.2020_final_reviseddraft_proposal_for_committee.pdf.
[hereinafter
Recommendations on the Public].
18 Decision I/3 supra, note 17, at pp. 20-22.
19 See United Nations Development Programme, et al., The Escazú Agreement: Human Rights and Healthy Ecosystems, 2021, p. 31,
available at https://www.learningfornature.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Escazu-Dialogue-Series-Report-Human-Rights-and-HealthyEcosustems-11.03.2022-Compressed.pdf.
20 At the time of writing, 13 ECLAC Member States had ratified the treaty. See ECLAC Information, Participation, and Justice, supra note
6.
21 Recommendations of the Public, supra note 17, ¶ 11.
22 See Krsticevic, Viviana and Cruz, Patricia. CEJIL, Escazú Now: We celebrate the entry into force of the Escazú Agreement, which
reaffirms the importance of rights and human rights defenders in fighting the climate emergency, (May 17, 2021), available at
https://cejil.org/en/blog/escazu-now-we-celebrate-the-entry-into-force-of-the-escazu-agreement-which-reaffirms-the-importance-ofrights-and-human-rights-defenders-in-fighting-the-climate-emergency/
23 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Informational Booklet: Petition and Case System, p.7, available at
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/Booklet/folleto_peticiones_EN.pdf; American Convention on Human Rights art. 47(b), 62(3), Nov. 21,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. [hereinafter American Convention].
24
See e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
125, ¶ 124-131 (June 17, 2005); Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
349, ¶ 103 (Mar. 8, 2018); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 92 (Nov. 28, 2007). For further discussion of this analytical approach, see the following section, “How to Use this
Toolkit,” infra.
16
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authority to consider the normative content of the Escazú Agreement to interpret and define State obligations
under the American Convention in cases involving violations of environmental human rights.25
Pursuant to Article 29 of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court has the authority to consider the
evolving nature of international human rights law.26 The Court has established that “[h]uman rights treaties are
living instruments the interpretation of which must evolve with the times and current conditions. This evolutive
interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American
Convention, as well as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”27
The Court has explained that it has the authority to interpret treaties “directly related to the protection of human
rights in a Member State of the inter-American system, even if that instrument does not belong to the same
regional system of protection.”28 To engage in this interpretive work, the Court must apply the pro persona
principle, which requires interpreting Article 29(b) as prohibiting any treaty provision from being interpreted as
“restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party
or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.” 29 Accordingly, for the Court to
determine whether the actions or omissions of a State are compatible with the Convention, the Court has
declared itself “able to interpret the obligations and rights they contain in light of other pertinent treaties and
norms.”30
In Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court reasserted its authority to
interpret “other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the States of the Americas” 31 and affirmed
its power to consider the evolving nature of international human rights to develop further protections in
environmental human rights.32
Recent jurisprudence indicates that the Court will continue to use external legal frameworks to interpret State
obligations related to environmental human rights. In the Nuestra Tierra case, discussed below, the Court
applied the same reasoning to interpret Article 26 of the American Convention and find a violation of the
independently-justiciable right to a healthy environment.33 In doing so, the Court affirmed “its competence to
25 The

Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee
of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Arts. 4(1) and 5(1) in relation to Arts. 1(1) and 2 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶ 40-45 (Nov. 15, 2017) [hereinafter
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17].
26 American Convention, supra note 23, at art. 29; Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 43.
27 Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (Nuestra Tierra) Association v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 197 (citing The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 114 (October 1, 1999); Case of Hernández
v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 395, ¶ 67 (Nov. 22, 2019); Acevedo
Buendia et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, ¶ 160 (July 1, 2009). see also Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 254, ¶ 83 (Feb. 24, 2012).
28 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 161 (June 27, 2012)
(quoting “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.1, ¶ 21 (September 24, 1982); Interpretation of the American Declaration on Rights and
Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 44 (July 14, 1989), and Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 22 (August 28, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29 American Convention, supra note 23, at art. 29(b); see also Advisory Opinion 05/85 at ¶ 52; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v.
Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 147 (Aug. 31, 2001).
30 Case of Hernández v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 395, ¶ 65.
31 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶17.
32
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 40-45, 48; see also Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 197 (citing
Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUBSUNAT) v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, ¶ 160, and Case of Hernández v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 395, ¶
67.
33 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400 ¶ 195 – 199, 202 – 203.
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determine violations of Article 26 of the American Convention and [its determination that] this protects those
economic, social, cultural and environmental rights (“ESCER”) derived from the [OAS Charter], and the norms
of interpretation established in Article 29 of the Convention are pertinent for their interpretation.”34
As such, the Escazú Agreement fits within this guidance and represents an important source of normative content
that should inform the Court’s evolving understanding of the human right to a healthy environment and related
procedural and substantive rights.35 In future cases, the Court should apply the analytical framework outlined
above to refer to the Escazú Agreement in interpreting the specific content of the right to a healthy environment
and other environmental human rights.
As the Inter-American Commission and its Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental
Rights have noted, “the Escazú Agreement reinforces principles and obligations established in inter-American
legislation and jurisprudence on the right to a healthy environment, highlighting the need to guarantee the socalled “access rights” to ensure its validity, such as the effective protection of the right for people to defend the
environment.”36 In accordance with this view, this toolkit illustrates the ways in which the Escazú Agreement
supports and strengthens existing human rights protections relevant to the right to a healthy environment and
the rights of human rights defenders to guide advocates in incorporating this new source of law into their litigation
and advocacy before the Inter-American System.
Essentially, the Escazú Agreement and its Compliance Committee are complementary to the Inter-American
System.37 The Compliance Committee will promote and guide treaty implementation and State compliance
specific to the Escazú Agreement. On the other hand, the Inter-American Court and Commission can interpret
how the Escazú Agreement informs the body of human rights law applicable to OAS member States and assess
whether States have violated their obligations under the American Convention or other Inter-American standards
in light of the Escazú Agreement when determining State responsibility in individual complaints. 38 Advocates
seeking to advance the incorporation of human rights principles into regional environmental governance while
achieving justice for individuals and communities facing human rights violations arising from environmental harm
can engage in both of these important processes.
This toolkit is divided into seven sections. Section III provides a legal framework for the human right to a healthy
environment. While the right to a healthy environment is not a core focus of the Escazú Agreement, it grounds
the discussion of procedural rights in the context of human rights affected by environmental risk, harm, or climate
change. Specifically, the right to a healthy environment grounds the procedural protections of the Escazú
Agreement because the Inter-American Court has recognized that the environmental access rights enshrined in
the Escazú Agreement are fundamentally intertwined with and derive from the human right to a healthy
environment. The toolkit addresses the legal foundations of this substantive right within the Inter-American
System and explores how the Escazú Agreement builds upon that normative framework.
34

Id. ¶ 195.
As experts are beginning to argue, the “Court can consider the Escazú Agreement as binding authority on States that have ratified the
treaty, but also persuasively for States that have not. The Court has emphasized that it also has the authority to consider the evolving
nature of international law, and as such the Escazú Agreement could be considered as codification of procedural human rights that have
been widely recognized in Inter-American jurisprudence.” Sarah Dávila A., The Escazú Agreement: The Last Piece of the Tripart
Normative Framework in the Right to a Healthy Environment, 42 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 3 (Forthcoming), at p. 15.
36 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Press Release: On Earth Day, IACHR and REDESCA welcome the entry into force of
the Escazú Agreement and call on the States of the region to strengthen their environmental public policies in the face of the climate
emergency (April 22, 2021), available at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/098.asp.
37 For further discussion, see Noroña, Daniel. The Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment, All hands on deck: Is the InterAmerican Human Rights System compatible with the Escazú Agreement? (August 25, 2021), available at https://gnhre.org/community/allhands-on-deck-is-the-inter-american-human-rights-system-compatible-with-the-escazu-agreement/; Medici-Colombo, Gastón. The
Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment, The Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American Human Rights System: a rich
synergy already in action (February 10, 2022), available at https://gnhre.org/access-to-information/the-escazu-agreement-and-the-interamerican-human-rights-system-a-rich-synergy-already-in-action/.
38 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 40-45.
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Section IV explains the core procedural rights protected under the Escazú Agreement – the rights to information,
participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. For each access right, the toolkit describes the
existing Inter-American normative framework and suggests how the Escazú Agreement’s detailed protections
may be used to complement and broaden enforcement of these rights through the mechanisms of the InterAmerican System.
Next, Section V discusses protections for vulnerable persons and groups. The toolkit explains how the InterAmerican System and the Escazú Agreement recognize that vulnerable groups and particularly human rights
defenders require heightened protections and State obligations to guarantee their human rights, including the
right to defend human rights.
Finally, the last Section explains how environmental access rights in the Escazú Agreement complement existing
Inter-American protections for related substantive rights that are likely to be affected by environmental harm,
using the right to health as an emblematic example.
Each section of the toolkit can be used as a standalone resource for advocates working on cases involving
environmental harm before the Inter-American System, or collectively as a comprehensive framework for the
litigation of procedural environmental human rights within the existing Inter-American normative framework.

III. The Right to a Healthy Environment
A. The Inter-American System and the Escazú Agreement Recognize the Human Right to a Healthy
Environment
Although the Escazú Agreement protects procedural rights – the rights to information, participation, and access
to justice, discussed in later sections – the treaty frames these environmental access rights as arising from and
essential to the human right to a healthy environment. Accordingly, any discussion of how the environmental
access rights enshrined in the Escazú Agreement might complement existing Inter-American norms should begin
with an examination of how these two normative frameworks understand the human right to a healthy
environment. First, this section describes how the Inter-American System has defined the human right to a
healthy environment, and then it assesses how the Escazú Agreement can complement this approach.
B. Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment by the Inter-American System
The Inter-American System unequivocally recognizes the human right to a healthy environment. In its 2017
Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court interprets and clarifies the right to a healthy
environment as a binding obligation for States.39 Subsequently, in the 2020 Nuestra Tierra judgment, the Court
recognized for the first time in its contentious jurisdiction that violations of the right to a healthy environment are
directly justiciable through Article 26 of the American Convention 40 and it further affirmed that States are obliged
to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to a healthy environment.41 In that case, the Court declared that States
can be found responsible for violating the right to a healthy environment when the State is made aware of harmful
environmental activities and subsequently fails to undertake effective actions to remedy the harm. 42
39

Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 57.
Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 202, 289. See also, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 57 (recognizing
that the right to a healthy environment “is included among the economic, social and cultural rights protected by Article 26 of the American
Convention, because this norm protects the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural provisions…”)
41 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 207.
42 Id.
40
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Although the right to a healthy environment is also explicitly recognized and protected under Article 11 of the
Protocol of San Salvador, the Court is not authorized to declare violations of that provision. 43 Instead, pursuant
to the Nuestra Tierra decision, litigants can now ask the Court to declare a violation of the autonomous human
right to a healthy environment contained in Article 26 of the American Convention.44
The right to a healthy environment is also inextricably connected to the enjoyment of other human rights.45 The
Court has stated that “all human rights are vulnerable to environmental degradation, in that the full enjoyment of
all human rights depends on a supportive environment.” 46 Therefore, environmental protection has been viewed
as a necessary pre-condition to the enjoyment and fulfillment of other fundamental human rights.47
The human rights that are interrelated to the right to a healthy environment are classified into two groups:
substantive rights and procedural rights.48 Substantive rights include the right to life, personal integrity, private
life, not to be forcefully displaced, participate in cultural life, food, water, housing, health, and property. 49
Procedural rights include freedom of expression, freedom of association, access to information, access to justice,
right to an effective remedy, and the right to participate in decision-making.50 As discussed below, the procedural
rights encompass the three pillars upon which the Escazú Agreement stands, which aim “to ensure the right of
all persons to have access to information in a timely and appropriate manner, to participate significantly in making
the decisions that affect their lives and their environment, and to access justice when those rights have been
infringed.”51
The Court has found that the right to a healthy environment has two dimensions of protection. 52 The first
dimension is the individual dimension, which protects individual persons. 53 It provides that violating an
individual’s right to a healthy environment may directly or indirectly violate their other human rights, such as the
right to health.54 This is due to the interrelatedness between the right to a healthy environment and other human
rights.55

43

Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156, 165 (1989) [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador], art. 11
(stating “1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services. 2. The States
Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment.”).
44 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 202-209, 289.
45 Sarah Dávila A., Making the Case for a Right to a Healthy Environment for the Protection of Vulnerable Communities: A Case of CoalAsh Disaster in Puerto Rico, 9 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 379 (2020), at 385.
46 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 54.
47 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.,
doc 56/09 ¶ 190 (2009); Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, ¶ 49.
48 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶¶ 54, 64.
49 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 66. See the right to life (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1948)); the right to housing (id at art. 25(1)); the right to not be forcefully displaced (id at art.
12); the right to participate in cultural life (id at art. 27); the right to food (id at art. 25); the right to health (id); the right to property (id); the
right to water (U.N Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, art. 11, 12 (May 12,
2003); and the right to personal integrity (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/RES/61/106, art. 17 (Dec. 13, 2006).
50 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, ¶¶ 64, 66. See the right to freedom of expression (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948)); the right to freedom of association (id at art. 20); the right of access to information
(id at art. 19); the right to an effective remedy (id at art. 8); the right to participate in decision-making (id. at art. 21).
51 Escazú Agreement, Preface by Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,
at pp. 7-8.
52 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 59.
53
Id.
54
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 59. For example, if there is environmental degradation and a specific individual suffers
or may suffer from health conditions, their life is or may be affected and that individual would have a claim under this particular dimension.
Id.
55 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 59.
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The second dimension is the collective dimension, which protects specific, identifiable groups or collectives of
persons.56 It provides that these groups, such as children or minorities, must be protected as they are particularly
affected by environmental degradation due to their group’s status.57 For example, indigenous persons can
exercise their rights to property as a collective, rather than individually, when States fail to protect or prevent
environmental damage in traditional indigenous lands and territories. 58 More broadly, the Court has suggested
that the collective dimension of the right to a healthy environment extends to humanity as a whole, because of
the existential threat posed by environmental harm.59
In addition to these two dimensions of protection, the environment itself is subject to protection and not just the
human populations living in it.60 The Court has formally recognized forests, rivers, and seas as protected under
the right to a healthy environment.61 The Court reasoned that these natural resources are protected even if there
is no certainty or evidence of risk to individual persons. 62
A State’s international responsibility for the violation of the substantive and procedural aspects of the right to a
healthy environment can stem not only from the State’s failure to respect that right, but from the State’s due
diligence obligations to protect it. Citing its Advisory Opinion The Environment and Human Rights, the Court
held in Nuestra Tierra that a State’s due diligence obligation to prevent violations of the right to a healthy
environment extends not only to the actions of State and public entities but also to those of private individuals
and other non-State actors.63 This due diligence obligation to protect from human rights violations by private
parties can be traced back to the Court’s first judgment in a contentious case in which the Court declared that
“[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is not initially directly imputable to a State can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of an act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond as required.”64
The Court also declared in Nuestra Tierra that the due diligence obligation to prevent violations of the right to a
healthy environment “encompasses all those legal, political, administrative and cultural measures that promote
the safeguard of human rights and that ensure that eventual violations of those rights are examined and dealt
with as wrongful acts.”65 For example, according to the Court, States are “bound to use all the means at their
disposal to avoid activities under its jurisdiction causing significant harm to the environment.” 66
Additionally, the Court has declared that the obligation to prevent violations of the right to a healthy environment
includes “the obligation to implement the necessary measures ex ante damage is caused to the environment,
taking into account that, owing to its particularities, after the damage has occurred, it will frequently not be
56

Id.
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 59. For further discussion of the heightened protections owed to vulnerable groups, see
the section on vulnerable groups and human rights defenders, See Section V.
58 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku
v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 145, 23; Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 48.
59 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 59.
60 Id. ¶ 62.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 207, citing The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to
the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of
Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 118.
64 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172, (Jul. 29, 1988).
65 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 207, citing The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to
the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of
Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 118.
66
Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 208, citing The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to
the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of
Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 142 and footnote
247.
57
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possible to restore the previous situation.”67 Among the measures States could take to comply with their due
diligence obligation to protect the right to a healthy environment, the Court has mentioned the obligations to “(i)
regulate; (ii) supervise and monitor; (iii) require and approve environmental impact assessments; (iv) establish
contingency plans, and (v) mitigate, when environmental damage has occurred.” 68
According to the Court, “States must[] . . . regulate activities that could cause significant harm to the environment
in order to reduce the risk”69 of other human rights violations.70 The monitoring and accountability mechanisms
must be adequate and independent.71 They must include both preventative measures and measures undertaken
to investigate, punish, and repair environmental harms and abuses, through policies, regulatory activities, and
ensuring access to justice.72 According to the Court, the greater the environmental risk, the more vigorous the
supervision and monitoring mechanisms must be. 73 States are also required to approve and conduct
environmental impact assessments (“EIAs”)74 that “include an evaluation of the potential social impact of the
project”75 when there is a risk of significant damage to the environment, regardless of whether the action causing
the damage is done by the State or by an individual. 76 States are required to adopt contingency plans that
respond to emergencies or environmental disasters, including security measures and procedures to minimize
the consequences.77 With regard to mitigation, States are required to immediately mitigate significant
environmental damage, even when it has occurred despite preventative measures. 78 It is important to emphasize
that the State’s international responsibility for third-party human rights violations generally arises from the lack
of regulation, supervision or control of the activities of these third parties that cause damage to the environment.79
In addition to the Inter-American Court decisions and opinions, the Commission has also issued several thematic
reports in which it has addressed issues related to the protection of the right to a healthy environment, such as
the reports on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples over their ancestral lands and natural resources
(2009),80 on human rights defenders (2017),81 on extractive industries (2016),82 and on business and human
rights (2020).83 Additionally, the Commission addressed the right to access to water in the Americas in its 2015
annual report.84 Advocates litigating before the Inter-American System should incorporate those sources in their
arguments as well.
67

Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 208.
Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 208, citing The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to
the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of
Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 145.
69 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 174.
70 Id. ¶¶ 145, 151, 174.
71 Id. ¶¶ 152-155.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is the primary domestic environmental management procedure to evaluate the likely impact
of a proposed activity on the environment. For further discussion, see Section IV: The Three Pillars of the Escazú Agreement, infra.
75 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 164 (citing to Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
172, ¶ 129, and Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209 ¶¶ 213
– 226.
76 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶¶ 156-170.
77 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 171.
78 Id. ¶¶ 171-173.
79 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 207.
80 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 56/09 (Dec. 30, 2009).
81 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Towards Effective Integral Protection Policies for Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 207 (Dec. 30,
2017).
82 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the
Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 47/15 31 (Dec. 31, 2015).
83
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Business and Human Rights: Inter-American Standards, OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/REDESCA/INF.1/19 (Nov. 1,
2019).
84 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., 2015 Annual Report, Chapter IV.A, Access to Water in the Americas – An Introduction to the Human Right to
Water in the Inter-American System (2015).
68
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C. Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment by United Nations Persuasive Authorities
In addition to citing the Inter-American sources of law, advocates litigating environmental harm cases before the
Inter-American System may also want to cite other persuasive sources on the right to a healthy environment.
For example, the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment has stated
that this is a right that is broad in scope and encompasses the right to enjoy a safe, clean, healthy, and
sustainable environment,85 and it provides protection from environmental harm that interferes with the full and
effective enjoyment of other human rights.86
Two important developments at the United Nations signal global recognition of the human right to a healthy
environment and its importance for tackling multiple challenges, including the triple planetary crisis of climate
change, pollution, and biodiversity loss.87 First, on October 8, 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council
adopted Resolution 48/13 recognizing the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.88
Shortly thereafter, on July 28, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a similar resolution with 161
votes in favor and zero against, signaling a broad consensus recognizing the right. 89 This recognition follows the
2018 Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment published by the UN Special Rapporteur on
the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable
environment.90 Advocates litigating before the Inter-American System may want to incorporate these UN
developments, as well as the principles of the Escazú Agreement mentioned below, to reflect the current or
emerging status of the basic obligations that States have under international human rights law in relation to the
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.
D. Recognition of the Human Right to a Healthy Environment by the Escazú Agreement
The Escazú Agreement can be used to complement and expand on the Inter-American Court’s understanding
of the right to a healthy environment. Article 4(1) of the agreement unambiguously recognizes the right to a
healthy environment by stating that “[e]ach Party shall guarantee the right of every person to live in a healthy
environment.”91 Article 1 of the treaty also defines its objective as fulfilling environmental access rights for the
purpose of contributing to the enjoyment of the human right to a healthy environment. 92 Furthermore, in its
Decision 1/6 on Human Rights Defenders in Environmental Matters, the First Conference of the Parties to
the Escazú Agreement also stressed that “the Escazú Agreement contributes to the right of every person to
live in a healthy environment[.]” 93
The Escazú Agreement not only demands that States guarantee the right to a healthy environment but also, as
will discussed below, adopt measures to protect environmental defenders, and harmonize their inte rnal

85

John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. A/73/188 (July 19,
2018).
86 John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/59 (Jan.
24, 2018).
87 See UN News, UN General Assembly declares access to clean and healthy environment a universal human right (28 July 2022),
available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123482.
88 H.R. Council Res. A/HRC/RES/48/13, The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment (Oct. 8, 2021).
89 U.N. General Assembly, Res. A/RES/76/300 (28 July 2022), available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3983329?ln=en; UN News
supra note 87.
90 Knox, supra note 86.
91
Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at 4(1).
92
Id. at art. 1. The Preface to the treaty by the UN Secretary-General also underscores this point, stating that "this treaty aims to . . .
guarantee the rights of every person to a healthy environment[.]" Escazú Agreement, Preface by Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of
the United Nations, at p. 5.
93 ECLAC Information, Participation, and Justice, supra note 6.
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legislation with the standards indicated in that instrument. To this end, the Escazú Agreement contains specific
provisions that require States to prevent environmental harm and protect environmental health. 94
States also have an obligation of prevention under the Escazú Agreement that requires them to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction do not cause significant environmental damage to areas outside of their
jurisdiction.95 Article 8 of the Escazú Agreement, for example, provides that States should have “the possibility
of ordering precautionary… measures… to prevent, halt, mitigate, or rehabilitate damage to the environment.” 96
As discussed in the Right to Information and Right to Participation sections of this toolkit, Article 6 of the Escazú
Agreement suggests that States must generate and disseminate environmental information, 97 including by
carrying out environmental impact assessments98 and other environmental decision-making processes with
public participation.99
In sum, as noted above, both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize the fundamental
interrelationship between the substantive right to a healthy environment and the procedural environmental
access rights protected under the Escazú Agreement. In this sense, the Escazú Agreement can be considered
the last piece of a tripart framework, along with the Court’s Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human
Rights and the Nuestra Tierra decision, that opens the door for concrete State obligations in the protection of the
right to a healthy environment through the Agreement’s three pillars: information, participation, and access to
justice in environmental matters.100 By incorporating these provisions of the Escazú Agreement into their legal
briefs, advocates litigating cases of environmental harm before the Inter-American System will help further
develop the normative content of the substantive and procedural human rights obligations States have to respect,
protect, and fulfill the human right to a healthy environment. The next section explores these procedural rights,
the three pillars of the Escazú Agreement, to guide advocates in mobilizing this new treaty to broaden and
deepen existing protections within the Inter-American System.

IV. The Three Pillars of the Escazú Agreement
The Escazú Agreement was adopted to promote regional implementation of the environmental access rights
protections – the rights to information, participation, and access to justice – identified in Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration101 as the procedural rights essential to the right to a healthy environment and sustainable
development.102 As noted above, this framework aligns with the procedural rights identified by the InterAmerican Court as inextricably linked to environmental degradation and the right to a healthy environme nt.103
Accordingly, the detailed environmental access rights protections of the Escazú Agreement can be used to
complement the Inter-American System’s understanding of these procedural rights in cases of environmental
harm.
94

Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8.
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 127-128, 140, 174. The Advisory Opinion provides that States are also required to meet
the precautionary principle, which requires States to take effective measures to protect the environment when there serious or irreversible
threats of damage (id. at ¶¶ 175-180). States must also meet the obligation to cooperate, which requires them to cooperate with other
States in case any activities, projects, or incidents may cause transboundary harm (id. at ¶¶ 181-210). Finally, the obligation of prevention
must also be met (id. ¶¶ 125, 127, 181, 211).
96 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8.
97 Id. art. 6.
98 Id. art. 6(3)(h).
99 Id. art. 7(9).
100 Dávila, supra note 35.
101 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). For further discussion of this history, see also Dávila, supra note 35 at notes 1011, 17-24; see also ECLAC, History of the Regional Agreement, available at https://www.cepal.org/en/subsidiary-bodies/acuerdoregional-acceso-la-informacion-la-participacion-publica-acceso-la-justicia/history-regional-agreement.
102 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at Preamble and art. 1.
103 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 64.
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The following sections of the toolkit address each of the three pillars in turn, providing first a description of existing
Inter-American norms relative to each procedural right, then providing suggestions for how advocates might use
the specialized protections provided by the Escazú Agreement to broaden the existing Inter-American normative
framework on environmental access rights.
A. Pillar One: The Right to Information in Environmental Matters
The right to access information is the first pillar of the Escazú Agreement and is well-established in international
human rights law.104 This section will provide a legal framework for the right to access information regarding
environmental matters. The Escazú Agreement provides specific protections on how information must be
provided, its accessibility, and measures for persons and groups in vulnerable situations. This section will also
explain interpretations of the right to access information from Inter-American precedent. Specifically, this section
focuses on how the Escazú Agreement can be used to complement and strengthen the obligation States have
under the Inter-American System to guarantee the right to access information in light of the principle of maximum
disclosure, including by affirmatively providing information including environmental impact assessments,
particularly to vulnerable groups.
1. The Inter-American System Recognizes the Right to Information
The Inter-American System recognizes the right to access information and its significance in the context of
environmental harm. This subsection analyzes relevant aspects of the Inter-American Court’s normative
framework around the right to access information and then provides additional detail regarding its recognition of
the right to access information specifically in relation to environmental harm in its Advisory Opinion on The
Environment and Human Rights.
Article 13(1) of the American Convention provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought and
expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in form or art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.” 105 In
Claude-Reyes v. Chile, the Inter-American Court interpreted Article 13 to encompass the right to access Stateheld information, holding that it:
protects the right of the individual to receive such information and the positive obligation of
the State to provide it, so that the individual may have access to such information or receive
an answer that includes a justification when, for any reason permitted by the Convention,
the State is allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific case. 106

Likewise, Principle 4 of the Inter-American Commission’s Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
provides that “[a]ccess to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every individual…[and] [t]his
principle allows only exceptional limitations that must be previously established by law in case of a real and
imminent danger that threatens national security in democratic societies.” 107 The Inter-American Commission’s
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression has noted that the right to freedom of expression (and information
within it) has been recognized to be essential for the preservation of rule of law and democracy. 108
104

Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 1, 5, 6; Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 76 – 81 (Sept. 19, 2006).
105 American Convention, art. 13(1)
106 Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77. See subsection (IV)(A)(iii)(b) below for further discussion of
permissible restrictions on access to State-held information.
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Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 108th regular period of sessions,
Oct. 2000, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basics/declaration-principles-freedom-expression.pdf, at Principle 4.
108 Inter-American Comm’n H.R., The Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
CIDH/RELE/INF.9/12, 7 Mar. 7 2011, pp. 1-2.
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In its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court listed the right to
information among the procedural rights most closely linked to environmental matters 109 and reiterated its
importance in promoting the realization of other core human rights. 110 The Court also linked the right to
information to the right to public participation with regard to environmental protection and sustainable
development, noting that “[a]ccess to State-held information of public interest can permit participation in public
administration by means of the social control that can be exercised through such access.”111 It noted the
applicability of this aspect of the right to information to the environmental context, observing “that access to
information on activities and projects that could have an impact on the environment is a matter of evident public
interest.”112 Although it found that the “right is not absolute,” 113 the Court ultimately declared that “States have
the obligation to respect and ensure access to information concerning possible environmental impacts.” 114
With regard to the content of the right to information in relation to the environment, the Court found that
“information must be handed over without the need to prove direct interest or personal involvement in order to
obtain it, except in cases in which a legitimate restriction is applied.” 115 It further noted that “access to
environmental information should be affordable, effective and timely.” 116 Finally, “[i]n the context of
environmental protection, [the] obligation [to respect and ensure the right to information] involves both providing
mechanisms and procedures for individuals to request information, and also the active compilation and
dissemination of information by the State.”117
Accordingly, the Court found that States have an “obligation of active transparency” 118 that requires States to
provide accurate, updated, understandable information in a timely and proactive manner to build public trust and
allow the public to use such information to exercise their other rights.119 In environmental matters, this obligation
requires States to provide “relevant and necessary information on the environment . . . includ[ing] information on
environmental quality, environmental impact on health and the factors that influence this, and also information
on legislation and policies, as well as assistance on how to obtain such information.” 120 This obligation applies
with heightened force in cases of environmental emergency.121
2. The Escazú Agreement Recognizes to Right to Information
The Escazú Agreement protects the right to access environmental information. It defines this term broadly to
encompass “any information . . . regarding the environment and its elements and natural resources, including
109

Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 64.
Id. ¶¶ 211, 217. It is worth noting that in ¶ 218, the Court observed with approval the forthcoming adoption of the Escazú Agreement
“as a positive measure to ensure the right of access to information in [environmental] matter[s].”
111 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 213.
112 Id. ¶ 214.
113 Id. ¶ 225. Permissible restrictions on the right to access information are discussed, infra, in subsection (IV)(A)(iii)(b).
114 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 225.
115 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 219.
116 Id. ¶ 220 (referencing the Bali Guidelines and a range of other international instruments).
117 Id. ¶ 225.
118 Id. ¶ 221.
119 Id.
120 Id. ¶ 223.
121 Id. Although at the time of writing the Inter-American Court had not yet issued a judgment in the case of La Oroya Community v. Peru,
the Inter-American Commission addressed this issue in its Merits Report, and the Court’s judgment is likely to contain relevant application
of these standards. See La Oroya Community v. Peru, Case No. 12.718, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 330/20, OEA/Ser.L/V/II doc.
348, ¶ 146-150 (Nov. 19, 2020), (but note that the citation in note 181 erroneously refers to the Inter-American Court’s judgment in the
Nuestra Tierra case; instead, it should refer to the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion 23). In the La Oroya Merits Report, ¶148, the
Inter-American Commission also signaled that the “[t]he right to access environmental information includes that information that is
necessary for the exercise or protection of human rights in the context of business activities, and this information should be provided in a
timely, comprehensible, accessible, updated, and complete manner.” (citing IACHR (2019) Business and Human Rights: Inter-American
Standards. OEA/Ser.L/V/II CIDH/REDESCA/INF.1/19, 1 Nov. 2019, ¶ 48.).
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information related to environmental risks, and any possible adverse impacts affecting or likely to affect the
environment and health, as well as to environmental protection and management.” 122 Article 5(1) of the Escazú
Agreement provides that a State Party must “ensure the public’s right of access to environmental information in
its possession, control or custody, in accordance with the principle of maximum disclosure.” 123
Under Article 5(2)(a) of the Escazú Agreement, the right of access to environmental information includes the
right to request and receive information.124 Specifically, the right to access information includes the right to “(a)
requesting and receiving information from competent authorities without mentioning any special interest or
explaining the reasons for that request; (b) being informed promptly whether the requested information is in
possession or not of the competent authority receiving the request; and (c) being informed of the right to
challenge and appeal when information is not being delivered.” 125
In doing so, States must guarantee that the “competent authorities generate, collect, publicize and disseminate
environmental information… in a systematic, proactive, timely, regular, accessible and comprehensible
manner.”126 States must provide and ensure the accessibility of information held by public authorities, including
information relating to environmental conditions, including environmental impact assessments. 127 Article 5(18)
requires States to create independent oversight mechanisms to assure “transparency in access to environmental
information, to oversee compliance with rules, and guarantee the right of access to information.”128
Furthermore, the Escazú Agreement provides that States have an obligation to ensure that vulnerable persons
and groups have access to environmental information by “establishing procedures for the provision of assistance,
from the formulation of requests through the delivery of the information, taking into account their conditions and
specificities, for the purpose of promoting access and participation under equal conditions.” 129
3. States Must Follow the Principle of Maximum Disclosure and May Only Place
Justified Limits on the Right to Information
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires States to Follow the Principle of Maximum
Disclosure and Justify Limits on the Right to Environmental Information
Although the Escazú Agreement allows States to restrict access to information under limited circumstances,
States must apply the “principle of maximum disclosure[]” in implementing their obligation to ensure the right to
access publicly-held information.130 Article 5 accordingly favors disclosure and provides specific limits on States’
ability to restrict access to information and includes procedural safeguards to allow the public to hold States
accountable when they exceed these limits.
First, information must be made accessible to everyone.131 States may not limit access by requiring the person
requesting the information to demonstrate “any special interest or explain[] the reasons for that request.” 132
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Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2(c).
Id. art. 5(1).
124 Id. art. 5(2).
125 Id.
126 Id. art. 6(1).
127 Id. art. 6(3)(h).
128
Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 5(18).
129
Id. art. 5(3)
130 Id. art. 5(1); see also Escazú Agreement, art 3(h).
131 Id. art. 5(1).
132 Id. art. 5(2)(a).
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The Escazú Agreement only permits States to limit access to environmental information under specific
circumstances.133 Article 5 directs States to follow their domestic rules regarding exceptions to the disclosure of
public information,134 in accordance with the procedural safeguards outlined below.135 In adopting and applying
these domestic rules, States must comply with their existing human rights obligations and “encourage the
adoption of exception regimes that favour the disclosure of information.” 136
For States that do not have a relevant domestic legal framework to apply, Article 5(6) of the Escazú Agreement
sets forth four enumerated exceptions to the general rule that States must disclose information. 137 These
exceptions allow States to limit access to information “when disclosure would put at risk the life, safety or health
of individuals.”138 States may also limit access to information where disclosure negatively affects “national
security, public safety[,]”139 environmental protection,140 or poses “a clear, probable and specific risk of
substantial harm to law enforcement[.]141
To deny access to information, States must have previously established by law and “clearly defined and
regulated” its reasons to do so.142 These reasons must take the public interest into account and “shall . . . be
interpreted restrictively.”143 States have to overcome the presumption that access to information is necessary
and bear the burden to prove that limitations to access information are justified.144 In determining whether a
restriction is justified, State authorities must apply a “public interest test [by] weigh[ing] the interest of withholding
the information against the public benefit of disclosing it, based on suitability, need and proportionality.” 145
However, under the Escazú Agreement, States must also comply with specific requirements designed to
enhance transparency and accountability regarding any refusal to disclose requested information. If a State
denies access to information pursuant to its domestic rules, it must communicate the “refusal in writing, including
the legal provisions and the reasons justifying the decision in each case, and inform the applicant of the right to
challenge and appeal.”146 In all circumstances, Article 5(2) specifies that to comply with their obligations to
guarantee the right to access information, States must “inform[] [the public] of the right to challenge and appeal
when information is not delivered, and of the requirements for exercising this right.” 147

b. The Escazú Agreement Can Guide the Inter-American System to Promote
Maximum Disclosure in Environmental Matters

133

Id. art. 5(5-6).
Id. art. 5(6).
135 Id. art. 5(5).
136 Id. art. 5(7).
137 Id. art. 5(6).
138 Id. art. 5(6)(a).
139 Id. art. 5(6)(b).
140 Id. art. 5(6)(c).
141 Id. art. 5(6)(d).
142 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 5(8).
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Id.
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Id. art. 5(5), 5(8).
145 Id. art. 5(9).
146 Id. art. 5(5).
147 Id. art. 5(2)(c).
134

19
Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System

Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System
Although the Inter-American System already limits the ability of States to restrict access to information, it has not
yet carefully explored how these limitations should apply in the specific context of environmental matters. 148 The
Escazú Agreement’s clear and precise standard may be invoked to encourage the Inter-American System to
strengthen its existing protections in this area and adapt them to cases involving the environment.
As noted above, Article 13 of the American Convention establishes a broad “freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information.”149 While this freedom is not absolute, restrictions on the right of information must be justified and
in accordance with the narrow grounds enumerated in Article 13(2). 150 Under these provisions, States may not
engage in “prior censorship”151 and may only permissibly restrict access to information through the “subsequent
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure . . . the rights
or reputations of others; or . . . the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.” 152 It
should be noted that the Inter-American Court has generally established that no other restrictions may be applied
to Article 13, whether from the general provision on limitations in Article 32 of the American Convention 153 or
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression from other international treaties.154
In Claude-Reyes v. Chile, the Court analyzed the compatibility of restrictions on State-held environmental
information with Article 13. In conducting its analysis, the Court “observe[d] that in a democratic society, it is
essential that the State authorities are governed by the principle of maximum disclosure, which establishes the
presumption that all information is accessible, subject to a limited system of exceptions.” 155 It also held that
because “Article 13 of the Convention protects the right of all individuals to request access to State-held
information,” States may not require the person requesting the information “to prove direct interest or personal
involvement in order to obtain it, except in cases in which a legitimate restriction is applied.” 156
The Court found that States may only restrict such information by law, for the purposes enumerated in Article
13(2).157 For restrictions to be imposed, they must also satisfy a proportionality test requiring that “the restriction
must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and must be appropriate for accomplishing this legitimate
purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the right.” 158 The Court explained that it
would only find a legitimate interest where the restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society; consequently,
they must be intended to satisfy a compelling government interest.” 159 The State must also select the least
restrictive means of achieving that purpose.160 Finally, the Court held that States bear the burden of showing
that any restrictions on access to State-held information comply with these requirements.161
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Note that in Nuestra Tierra, the Inter-American Court declined to rule on an alleged Article 13 right to access information violation due
to a lack of evidence. Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 185.
149 American Convention, supra note 23, at art.13(1).
150 Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77, 88 (Sept.19,
2006).; American Convention supra note 23 at art. 13(2-5). Article 13(3) prohibits State restrictions “by indirect methods or means . . .
tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” Article 13(4) allows prior censorship of “public entertainments
. . . for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.” Article 13(5) allows States to prohibit incitement of violence and hate crimes.
151 American Convention, supra note 23, at art. 13(2).
152 Id.
153 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, ¶ 65 (Nov. 13, 1985).
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155 Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 92.
156 Id. ¶ 77.
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Id. ¶ 90.
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Id. ¶ 91.
159 Id.
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161 Id. ¶ 93.
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In Gomes Lund v. Brazil, the Court affirmed that the principle of good faith and maximum disclosure should limit
restrictions on access to State-held information.162 Accordingly, it reasserted that “State power is presumed
public and accessible, subject to a limited regime of exceptions.” 163 As in Claude-Reyes, the Court in Gomes
Lund held that States must justify any restriction and bear the burden to demonstrate “the impossibility of
presenting said information, and given doubts or empty legal arguments, the right to access to information will
be favored.”164 The Court emphasized that in cases where “judicial or administrative authorities in charge of the
ongoing investigation or pending procedures”165 need access to State-held information, the State could not avoid
disclosure by claiming State secrets, confidentiality, public interest, or national security.166
The Court incorporated these standards in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, where
it reiterated the proportionality test and requirements established in Claude-Reyes.167 It observed that “the
principle of maximum disclosure is applicable [to access to State-held information], based on the presumption
that all information is accessible, subject to a limited system of exceptions.”168 Likewise, “the burden of proof to
justify any denial of access to information must be borne by the entity from whom the information was
requested.”169 States may only refuse to provide information by justifying its decision “in a way that allows the
reasons and rules on which it has based the decision not to deliver the information to be known.” 170 Any refusal
lacking such justification will be considered arbitrary.171
The Escazú Agreement provisions described above complement this existing Inter-American normative
framework on the limitations placed on the State restriction of access to information. Advocates may be able to
use the specific guidelines in Article 5 of the Escazú Agreement to encourage the Inter-American System to build
from what it already established in Claude-Reyes to strengthen protections around the right to access State-held
or controlled environmental information. For example, advocates may draw upon the Escazú Agreement’s
commitment to the principle of maximum disclosure as a core principle of environmental access rights, as well
as its related access to information provisions172 to argue that the Inter-American System should apply a strict
proportionality standard that favors disclosure on any restrictions on the right to access information in
environmental matters.
4. States Must Take Affirmative Steps to Produce and Disseminate Information
The Escazú Agreement not only requires that States make environmental information accessible, but it also
directs States to actively produce and disseminate such information. The inclusion of this proactive duty
recognizes that in a technically complex area like the environment, the right to access information has no
meaning unless comprehensible, accessible, and accurate information exists and is made publicly available in
an organized, updated format. Accordingly, the Agreement provides detailed guidelines as to the types of
environmental information that States must produce, how it should be organized, and the means States must
implement to ensure that this information is properly disseminated and updated. Many of these obligations are
subject to a progressive realization standard whereby States must achieve them “to the extent possible within
available resources[.]”173
162

Gomes Lund et al v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 199, 230
(Nov. 24, 2010).
163 Id. ¶ 230.
164 Id.
165 Id. ¶ 202.
166 Id. ¶¶ 202, 230.
167 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 213, 224.
168 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 224.
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172 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 5(1, 2, 5-10).
173 Id. art. 6(1).
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Article 6(1) requires States to “generate, collect, publicize and disseminate environmental information relevant
to their functions in a systematic, proactive, timely, regular, accessible and comprehensible manner.” 174 States
must also periodically update the information175 and encourage the disaggregation and decentralization of
environmental information at the subnational and local levels.176 This information must also be “reusable,
processable and available in formats that are accessible, and that no restrictions are placed on its reproduction
or use[.]”177
Article 6 contains a number of highly specific requirements as to the different ways that States must produce and
publicize environmental information. In addition to the requirements described below, States must also
“encourage independent environmental performance reviews[;]” 178 “promote access to environmental
information contained in concessions, contracts, agreements or authorizations granted, which involve the use of
public goods, services or resources[;]”179 “ensure that consumers and users have official, relevant and clear
information on the environmental qualities of goods and services and their effects on health[.]”180 As discussed
in more detail in subsection V below, States must also facilitate access to information by persons in vulnerable
situations by “disseminat[ing] environmental information in the various languages used in the country, and
prepar[ing] alternative formats that are comprehensible to those groups using suitable channels of
communication.”181
States must publish “a national report on the state of the environment” every five years or less, that contains
quantitative data on the state of the environment and natural resources, efforts to implement national
environmental laws, an assessment of domestic implementation of environmental access rights, and
collaboration between different sectors.182 Article 6(7) specifies that “[s]uch reports shall be drafted in an easily
comprehensible manner and accessible to the public in different formats and disseminated through appropriate
means, taking into account cultural realities.”183
Article 6(3) of the Escazú Agreement requires that States have in place one or more up-to-date environmental
information systems.184 These systems may provide information about pertinent resources and regulations,
including environmental laws,185 relevant public authorities,186 scientific or academic studies,187 climate change
information,188 “information on environmental impact assessment processes and on other environmental
management instruments, where applicable, and environmental licences or permits granted by the public
authorities;”189 and “information on the imposition of administrative sanctions in environmental matters.” 190 They
may also include substantive information about the state of the environment, 191 such as “a list of polluted areas,
174

Id. art. 6(1).
Id. Article 6(11) adds the additional requirement that States must “create and keep regularly updated its archiving and document
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all times.”
176 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 6(1).
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179 Id. art. 6(9).
180 Id. art. 6(10).
181 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 6(6).
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by type of pollutant and location;”192 “information on the use and conservation of natural resources and
ecosystem services;”193 and “an estimated list of waste by type and, when possible, by volume, location and
year[.]”194 In order to ensure that their environmental information systems facilitate access to environmental
information, States must ensure that they “are duly organized, accessible to all persons and made progressively
available through information technology and georeferenced media[.]” 195
In addition, pursuant to Article 6(4), States must also “take steps to establish a pollutant release and transfer
register covering air, water, soil and subsoil pollutants, as well as materials and waste in its jurisdiction.” 196 The
provision allows for the register to “be established progressively” and requires that it be “updated periodically.”197
Similarly, Article 6(5) also requires States to establish an early warning system for situations that pose “an
imminent threat to public health or the environment[.]” 198 States must “immediately disclose and disseminate
through the most effective means all pertinent information in its possession that could help the public take
measures to prevent or limit potential damage.”199
Although the Escazú Agreement primarily refers to State-held or controlled information,200 it recognizes that the
public also needs access to privately held information. Article 6(12) requires States to “take the necessary
measures . . . to promote access to environmental information in the possession of private entities, in particular
information on their operations and the possible risks and effects on human health and the environment.” 201
Article 6(13) similarly requires States to “encourage public and private companies, particularly large companies,
to prepare sustainability reports that reflect their social and environmental performance.” 202
5. The Escazú Agreement Can Provide the Inter-American System with Strong,
Specific Content to Inform States’ Obligation of Active Transparency in
Environmental Matters
As noted above, the Inter-American Court in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights
established that States have an obligation of active transparency to take proactive steps to share environmental
information with the public.203 The Court’s forthcoming judgment in the La Oroya case will likely feature the
application of this framework to Perú’s violation of the La Oroya community’s right to information about the
environmental and health impacts of the metallurgical complex at issue in that case. 204 Together with these
expected jurisprudential developments, advocates can use the Escazú Agreement provisions discussed above
to encourage the Inter-American System to define the obligation of active transparency to include stronger and
more specific requirements to produce, organize, update, and disseminate environmental information.
The Court derived the obligation of active transparency from its recognition of the public’s right to access Stateheld information in Claude-Reyes, as well as the right to obtain information necessary for the exercise of other

192
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rights, recognized in I.V. v. Bolivia.205 As noted above, in Claude-Reyes the Court established that the right to
access information necessarily entails a corresponding positive State obligation to provide that information. 206
In I.V., the Court held that “[t]he obligation of the State to provide information ex officio, known as “active
transparency obligation,” imposes on States the duty to provide the necessary information for individuals to be
able to exercise other rights,” which in turn indicates that “the right of access to information has an instrumental
nature to achieve the satisfaction of other rights under the Convention.” 207 This reasoning is reflected, for
example, in the Court’s conclusion that the right to participation cannot be effectively exercised if the State has
failed in its obligation to provide the necessary information beforehand.208
In its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court reaffirmed that this positive “‘obligation
of active transparency’”209 requires States to “provide the information requested, so that the individual may have
access to it in order to examine and assess it[,]” 210 and ensure that the information provided is what is necessary
“for individuals to be able to exercise other rights . . . particularly . . . in relation to the rights to life, personal
integrity, and health.”211 In fulfilling this obligation, States should “provide the public with as much information as
possible on an informal basis[,]” 212 and, to maintain public trust, it should “deliver information that is clear,
complete, timely, true and up-to-date.”213 Finally, “[t]his information should be . . . understandable, in an
accessible language, . . . and be provided in a way that is helpful to the different sectors of the population.” 214
With regard to the environment, the Court suggested that this obligation of active transparency encompasses a
State duty to proactively share information with the public, particularly where such information may have a
bearing on other human rights.215 The duty to publish “relevant and necessary information on the environment .
. . includes information on environmental quality, environmental impact on health and the factors that influence
this, and also information on legislation and policies, as well as assistance on how to obtain such information.” 216
States must be particularly proactive with regard to this obligation “in cases of environmental emergencies that
require relevant and necessary information to be disseminated immediately and without delay to comply with the
duty of prevention.”217
In its Merits Report in the La Oroya case, the Inter-American Commission referred to this standard218 and found
that Peru had failed to uphold its duty of active transparency by failing to “actively produce necessary information
in a timely manner about the environment in La Oroya in order to guarantee the human rights of its residents.” 219
In analyzing the obligation of active transparency, the Commission reasoned that “the State should ensure that
the members of a community are aware of the possible risks, including environmental and health risks caused
by State decisions regarding business activities[.]” 220 Accordingly, it noted that Peru’s failure had particularly
serious consequences because the residents were therefore unable to protect themselves from the serious
205
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and Case of I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, ¶ 156 (Nov. 30,
2016)).
206 Case of Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77.
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health risks caused by very high levels of contamination, which the Commission characterized as “one of the
worst environmental emergencies in the world[.]”221
Advocates can encourage the Inter-American System to deepen this existing normative framework by
incorporating the strong, specific requirements of Article 6 of the Escazú Agreement regarding the environmental
information that States must affirmatively produce, organize, update, and disseminate. Beyond requiring that
States actively provide information about particular situations of environmental impact, Article 6 calls for the
establishment of long-term environmental monitoring mechanisms that should provide the public with a view of
how environmental quality is changing over time as a result of State environmental decision-making. Because
the right to a healthy environment implicates many other human rights, 222 States need to create these kinds of
environmental information systems to provide the public with the necessary information to understand how
environmental harm may be affecting their other rights and to allow them to take preventive or protective action.
By this approach, the Inter-American System can look to the Escazú Agreement to provide specific content
regarding the ways that States should produce and disseminate environmental information pursuant to the
obligation of affirmative transparency. It can also more fully conceptualize how the interconnections between
environmental access rights, the right to a healthy environment, and affected substantive rights can be
addressed by this instrumental application of the right to access information.

6. States Must Carry Out Prior Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
a. The Escazú Agreement Recognizes that States Must Carry Out and
Publicize Prior Environmental Impact Assessments
The Escazú Agreement recognizes that Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) are an important source of
environmental information that also facilitate effective public participation in environmental decision -making.223
Although the Escazú Agreement does not provide a definition of EIAs, they are widely incorporated into
international and domestic environmental laws224 and are generally understood to be the primary domestic
environmental management procedure to evaluate the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment
“with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable development.” 225 An EIA is commonly designed
to inform and elicit feedback from those who may be affected.226 In addition to identifying environmental impacts
and potential mitigation measures, EIAs typically provide an assessment of alternatives to the proposed
221
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activity.227 Pursuant to the Rio Declaration, “[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall
be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and
are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.”228
Several provisions of the Escazú Agreement support the importance of public access to EIAs. Article 6(3)(h) of
the Escazú Agreement suggests that States should include “information on environmental impact assessment
processes and on other environmental management instruments” in their environmental information systems.229
Article 7(9) of the Escazú Agreement requires that States publicly share the decision made after consideration
of an EIA and related public input “in an effective and prompt manner[.]” 230 To ensure that affected communities
have the information necessary to challenge such decisions, this information should “include the established
procedure to allow the public to take the relevant administrative and judicial actions.” 231
Likewise, Article 7(17) requires States to share multiple categories of information associated with EIAs to ensure
that the public can effectively participate in the environmental decision-making processes informed by these
assessments.232 In addition to descriptions of the impacts of the proposed project or activity 233 and measures to
address those impacts,234 these categories include: reports and analyses by the entities involved in the project,235
information about potential technologies and alternative locations,236 and “actions to monitor the implementation
and results of environmental impact assessment measures.”237
b. The Escazú Agreement Can Support the Inter-American System in
Broadening its Normative Framework on Environmental and Social Impact
Assessments
The Inter-American System has established a strong normative framework requiring States to conduct prior
environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) 238 that must be used to inform the required free, prior,
and informed consultation procedures that States must engage in with indigenous and tribal peoples whose
collective property rights may be affected by a proposed project or development. 239 In its Advisory Opinion on
The Environment and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court acknowledged that although it had previously
only required EIAs in indigenous peoples’ rights cases,240 “the obligation to make an environmental impact
assessment also exists in relation to any activity that may cause significant environmental damage.” 241 The
Court also engaged in a substantial discussion of EIAs as one of the supervision and monitoring measures that
227
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States must carry out to prevent environmental harm from violating the rights to life and personal integrity. 242
These developments have set the stage for the Inter-American System to apply its ESIA requirements more
broadly, and the Escazú Agreement’s recognition of the important role that EIAs play in guaranteeing the right
to access information may be used to encourage this normative expansion.
In describing the process States must undertake to fulfill indigenous peoples’ right to consultation, the Court has
repeatedly held that the State must complete environmental and social impact assessments prior to makin g
decisions that could impact the collective property rights of the indigenous peoples in question. 243 As the Court
made clear in Saramaka, the State may not grant concessions within indigenous territories before conducting
an adequate environmental and social impact study.244 Without providing such a study at the earliest stages of
a project’s development, consultation cannot be meaningfully prior or informed.
In Sarayaku, the Court provided more specific guidance for what would constitute an adequate ESIA. It specified
that the ESIA must be carried out by “independent and technically competent bodies, under the supervision of
the State[,]”245 and “in conformity with the relevant international standards and best practices[.]” 246 It must also
“respect the indigenous peoples’ traditions and culture, and be completed before the concession is granted . . .
to guarantee the effective participation of the indigenous people in the process of granting concessions.” 247 This
means that the State must guarantee that the ESIA is prepared with the participation of the affected indigenous
peoples.248
The Court has indicated that States must use ESIAs to ensure that the affected community is aware of the
possible risks, including environmental threats and health risks, in order for them to accept the proposed
development or investment plan on an informed and voluntary basis. 249 ESIAs must address “the cumulative
impact of existing and proposed projects.”250 The study also needs to address the social, cultural, and spiritual
impacts deriving from the proposed project.251
In Nuestra Tierra, the Court reaffirmed that States must guarantee that “no concession will be granted on
[indigenous] territory unless and until independent and technically capable entities, under the State’s supervision,
have made a prior environmental impact assessment.252 The Court further noted that ESIAs “should not be
conducted as a mere formality, but should make it possible to evaluate alternatives and the adoption of impact
mitigation measures[.]”253 To do so, the ESIA must comply with the criteria outlined above.254 The Court clarified
that the affected community’s participation in the development of the ESIA is “not the same as the exercise of

Id. ¶ 149, 154 (holding that “the Inter-American Court considers that States have an obligation to supervise and monitor activities
within their jurisdiction that may cause significant damage to the environment. Accordingly, States must develop and implement adequate
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the right to free, prior and informed consultation of the indigenous peoples or communities [], which is more wideranging.” 255
In its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court included the “[d]uty to require and
approve environmental impact assessments”256 among the required actions States must take to “regulate
activities that could cause significant environmental damage in a way that reduces any threat to the rights to life
and to personal integrity.”257 It provided detailed guidelines for environmental impact assessments and explicitly
noted that although its prior jurisprudence on ESIAs focused exclusively on indigenous peoples, these guidelines
should apply broadly258 “when there is a risk of significant environmental harm, regardless of whether the activity
or project will be carried out by a State or by private persons.” 259 The Court determined that under these
circumstances, the State must carry out an EIA that:
must be made by independent entities with State oversight prior to implementation of the
activity or project, include the cumulative impact, respect the traditions and culture of any
indigenous peoples who could be affected, and the content of such assessments must be
determined and defined by law or within the framework of the project authorization process,
taking into account the nature and size of the project and its potential impact on the
environment[.]260

As to this last element, the Court specified that States must enact domestic laws or regulations regarding EIAs
that:
must be clear, at least as regards: (i) the proposed activities and the impact that must be
assessed (areas and aspects to be covered); (ii) the process for making an environmental
impact assessment (requirements and procedures); (iii) the responsibilities and duties of
project proponents, competent authorities and decision-making bodies (responsibilities
and duties); (iv) how the environmental impact assessment process will be used in
approval of the proposed actions (relationship to decision-making), and (v) the steps and
measures that are to be taken in the event that due procedure is not followed in carrying
out the environmental impact assessment or implementing the terms and conditions of
approval (compliance and implementation). 261

Although the Court did not specify whether States need to include the social element of EIAs in situations that
do not affect indigenous peoples, it found that States “must take into account the impact that the project may
have on its human rights obligations.”262 It also suggested that this human rights impact analysis may be
equivalent to the social component required in EIAs for cases involving indigenous peoples. 263
Similarly, the Court did not include the participation of interested parties as a required element, seemingly
because the Court has not yet ruled on this issue outside of the indigenous peoples’ rights context. 264 However,
the Court recommended that States allow such participation, finding that “the participation of the interested public
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allows for a more complete assessment of the possible impact of a project or activity and whether it will affect
human rights.”265
Finally, the Court indicated that “[t]he content of the environmental impact assessment will depend on the specific
circumstances of each case and the level of risk of the proposed activity.” 266 The Court found that “States should
determine and define, by law or by the project authorization process, the specific content required of an
environmental impact assessment, taking into account the nature and size of the project and its potential impact
on the environment.”267
As the Inter-American System begins to integrate these principles into its contentious jurisprudence, the Escazú
Agreement will provide useful support to promote stronger and more specific requirements for the way States
must regulate and carry out EIAs. With respect to domestic regulation of EIAs, the procedural requirements in
the Escazú Agreement described above give specific content to these requirements and can be used to guide
the Inter-American System in applying this standard in future contentious cases.
Given its broad conceptualization of persons and groups in vulnerable situations 268 and strong focus on nondiscrimination and equality in the exercise of environmental access rights, 269 the Escazú Agreement may also
support the argument that the “social” dimension of EIAs as conceptualized in the Court’s indigenous peoples’
rights jurisprudence should likewise be extended. The Escazú Agreement’s strong and detailed protections with
regard to the rights to information and participation, including those outlined above and in the next section, can
be used both to encourage the Inter-American System to take the additional step of requiring public participation
as an element of adequate EIAs and to give specific content to that element, once adopted.
Furthermore, even with the normative developments described here, the Inter-American System has not yet
provided substantial guidance regarding the minimum standards for how States must conduct the process of
regulating and carrying out EIAs itself to comply with the rights to access information and to participation. The
relevant provisions of the Escazú Agreement will assist the Inter-American System in elaborating what States
must do in order to ensure such compliance. For example, requiring States to make information about EIAs
publicly available pursuant to Article 6(3)(h) helps guarantee that EIAs themselves are part of the environmental
information that the public can access.270
Similarly, the Article 7(9) requirement that States make information about the final decision on an EIA publicly
available also helps make sure the domestic EIA process occurs in compliance with the right to access
environmental information; the corresponding requirement that States simultaneously provide information about
the process to challenge such decisions brings the EIA procedure at least partially into compliance with the right
to access justice.271 The detailed list of information States must make public pursuant to Article 7(17) not only
helps make the EIA process consonant with the right to access information but also facilitates public participation
in the environmental decision-making process by making necessary information available and accessible. 272
Other provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 7 have similar effects, even when they do not mention EIAs specifically;
this is particularly true for Article 5(18), which requires States to establish an independent entity to “promote
transparency in access to environmental information, to oversee compliance with rules, and monitor, report on
265
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and guarantee the right of access to information.”273 The Escazú Agreement can therefore be used to fill an
important gap in the Inter-American System’s approach to EIAs by providing specific content for the procedural
protections that should apply to domestic EIA mechanisms.
7. States Must Assure Access to Information for Vulnerable Groups
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires States to Promote Access to Information
to Persons or Groups in Vulnerable Situations
Several provisions of the Escazú Agreement relating to the right to access information reinforce States’ obligation
to promote access to information by persons or groups in vulnerable situations.
First, Article 5(3) requires States to “facilitate access to environmental information for persons or groups in
vulnerable situations . . . for the purpose of promoting access and participation under equal conditions.” 274 To
do so, States must “establish[] procedures for the provision of assistance, from the formulation of requests
through to the delivery of information[.]” 275 These procedures must “take[] into account [vulnerable persons’]
conditions and specificities[,]”276 to ensure the assistance is tailored to the particular situation of vulnerability and
specific needs at issue.277
Similarly, Article 5(4) directs States to guarantee “that . . . persons or groups in vulnerable situations, including
indigenous peoples and ethnic groups, receive assistance in preparing their requests and obtain a response.”278
Beyond specifying a particular type of assistance that the State must provide to facilitate access to information
by vulnerable groups, this provision places the burden on the State to affirmatively ensure that the appropriate
public authorities respond to all requests for information from such groups.
In recognition that cost can be a barrier to accessing information for vulnerable groups, Article Article 5(17)
facilitates access by requiring States to provide information at no cost. 279 Although this provision allows States
to impose reasonable “reproduction and delivery costs[,]” States are encouraged to waive payment when “the
applicant is deemed to be in a vulnerable situation or to have special circumstances warranting such a waiver.”280
Although the State’s active duty to disseminate environmental information is intended, at least in part, to reduce
barriers in accessing environmental information, Article 6(6) recognizes that language can be another barrier for
vulnerable groups. Accordingly, “[i]n order to facilitate access by persons or groups in vulnerable situations to
information that particularly affects them,” States must make their best efforts “to ensure that the competent
authorities disseminate environmental information in the various languages used in the country[.]” 281 They
should also “prepare alternative formats that are comprehensible to [vulnerable groups], using suitable channels
of communication.”282 To be suitable, such channels should likely be culturally appropriate and designed with
the specific circumstances of vulnerable groups in mind.
Finally, by defining environmental information to encompass the actual or potential health effects of
environmental harm,283 the Escazú Agreement also ensures that its protections for the right to access information
273
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cover an area of significant priority for vulnerable groups. Likewise, by including “a list of polluted areas,” 284 “an
estimated list of waste by type[,]”285 among others, in environmental information systems pursuant Article 6(3),
the Escazú Agreement encourages States to provide information that enhances the ability of vulnerable groups
both to identify themselves as such and to push against the potentially hazardous cumulative impact of multiple
sources of pollution – including toxic waste – in their communities. Several other provisions may have a similar
effect, including the pollutant release and transfer register envisioned in Article 6(4), 286 the early warning system
in Article 6(5),287 and the requirement that States encourage private entities to share information about the
environmental and health risks of their operations in Article 6(12) 288 serve similar functions.
b. The Escazú Agreement Can Provide the Inter-American System with
Specific Content to Guarantee Vulnerable Groups’ Right to Environmental
Information
As discussed in Section V on Vulnerable Peoples, the Inter-American System has repeatedly recognized that
States owe a heightened duty of protection to vulnerable persons. However, it has not yet developed detailed
normative guidance for States on the steps they should take to give effect to this heightened duty in the context
of the right to access environmental information. Advocates accordingly have an opportunity to incorporate the
specialized provisions of the Escazú Agreement to guide the Inter-American System in providing strong
protections in this regard.
In Ximenes Lopes, the Court recognized that some groups of people are more vulnerable to harm than others
and held that States must provide “special protection” to “any person who is in a vulnerable condition.” 289
Although the Court has acknowledged that this obligation extends to the right to a healthy environment, it has
not yet applied it in the context of related environmental access rights.290 The Inter-American Commission’s
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has, however, emphasized that within the Inter-American System,
the right to access information “is considered a fundamental tool . . . for the general fulfillment of other human
rights, especially for the most vulnerable groups.”291
Although the “informed” element of indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consu ltation
and consent292 logically implicates the right to access information, the Inter-American Court has not yet
incorporated this right into its normative framework. The Inter-American Commission has consistently found
Article 13 violations in cases involving this issue,293 and it is possible that the Court will incorporate it in the future.
In its most recent judgment, Nuestra Tierra, the Court declined to rule on the alleged violation of Article 13 due
to lack of evidence.294 However, it reiterated that in the context of activities that may affect indigenous territory,
States must consult with the affected indigenous peoples, which in addition to other obligations, requires States
“to receive and provide information and also to ensure constant communication between the parties.”295 In
284
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Sarayaku, the Court also required that States undertake consultation in a manner that can be understood by the
affected indigenous or tribal peoples, including in the language spoken by the majority of community residents. 296
As the Inter-American System deepens its normative framework around the right to information in environmental
matters, it will have more opportunities to connect these disparate pieces and recognize that States owe
vulnerable groups a heightened duty to protect this right. Advocates can encourage it to do so with particular
force by raising arguments based in the specialized protections of the Escazú Agreement. For example, in the
La Oroya case, the State failed to provide the community with timely, accurate, and accessible information about
the actual health effects and health risks of the severe environmental contamination caused by the metallurgical
complex, thereby depriving community members of the ability to take preventive measures. 297 Applying Escazú
Agreement protections to environmental information of this kind would provide States with very clear direction to
make sure people in vulnerable situations have information essential to protecting their rights to health, personal
integrity, and life, among others.
8. Conclusion
In sum, both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize the right to access information.
By incorporating provisions of the Escazú Agreement in their arguments before the institutions of the Inter American System, advocates litigating cases of environmental harm can deepen existing protections of the right
to access information in relation to the environment. The next section discusses the right to participation, which
is interconnected and interdependent on the right to information. For individuals and groups to exercise their
right to participation, they must have their right to information protected.
B. Pilar Two: The Right to Participation in Environmental Matters
In sum, both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize the right to access information.
By incorporating provisions of the Escazú Agreement in their arguments before the institutions of the Inter American System, advocates litigating cases of environmental harm can deepen existing protections of the right
to access information in relation to the environment. The next section discusses the right to participation, which
is interconnected and interdependent on the right to information. For individuals and groups to exercise their
right to participation, they must have their right to information protected.
1. The Inter-American System Recognizes the Right to Participation
The Inter-American System recognizes the right to participation and its importance in environmental matters.
This subsection analyzes the Inter-American Court’s recognition of the right to participation in the context of
environmental harm in its contentious jurisdiction and also in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and
Human Rights and then offers further detail on salient facets of the Inter-American System’s normative
framework around the right to participation.
The Inter-American Court has primarily grounded the right to public participation in Article 23 of the American
Convention, which ensures that all individuals are granted the right to participate freely in their government. 298
Specifically, individuals are guaranteed the right to take part in public affairs, the right to freely vote and be
elected in genuine periodic elections, and the right to have access to the public services of one’s country.299
Article 23(2) allows a State to regulate the rights above “only on the basis of age, nationality, residence,
296
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language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.” 300
The Inter-American Court has held that “[t]he right to participate in government specifically implies that citizens
not only have the right, but also the opportunity, to participate in the conduct of public affairs[,]” 301 and
accordingly, States must “adopt measures that guarantee the necessary conditions for the full exercise of [this]
right.”302
It is worth noting that the majority of the Inter-American Court’s relevant jurisprudence interpreting this right
relates to public participation as a component of indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to consultation, discussed
infra. at page 40. The Court’s forthcoming judgment in the La Oroya case will likely represent an important first
step in expanding the Court’s normative framework on the right of non-indigenous communities to participate in
environmental decision-making that affects them.303 Accordingly, advocates have an opportunity to build from
the Court’s interpretation of Article 23 in its Advisory Opinion on The Environmental and Human Rights,
discussed below, by using the specialized provisions of the Escazú Agreement to deepen the Inter-American
System’s understanding of this right in environmental matters.304
In the Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court listed the right “to participation in
decision-making” among the essential procedural rights most tightly connected to environmental matters.305 The
Court also noted that “[p]ublic participation is one of the fundamental pillars of . . . procedural rights[]” 306 with vital
importance for the accountability, effectiveness, and credibility of public authorities and government
processes.307 Ultimately, the Court held that States must guarantee the right to public participation in “decisionmaking and policies that could affect the environment, without discrimination and in a fair, significant and
transparent manner[.]”308
When examining the right in the context of environmental matters, the Court observed that “participation is a
mechanism for integrating public concerns and knowledge into public policy decisions affecting the
environment.”309 The Court added that “participation in decision-making makes Governments better able to
respond promptly to public concerns and demands, build consensus, and secure increased acceptance of and
compliance with environmental decisions.”
The Court emphasized the interconnections between the right to participation and the right to information, which
in certain circumstances acts as a precondition for effective exercise of the right to participation. 310 Specifically,
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it held that to fulfill their obligation to guarantee the right to public participation, “States must have previously
ensured access to the necessary information.”311 It also noted that “public participation requires implementation
of the principles of disclosure and transparency and, above all, should be supported by access to information
that permits social control through effective and responsible participation.” 312
Citing the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court underscored that, in order to guarantee
the right to participation, individuals must have the power “to challenge official acts or omissions that affect their
rights before an independent authority and to play an active role in the planning procedures for activities and
projects by expressing their opinions.”313 The Court indicated that States can implement a wide range of
mechanisms to facilitate “public participation in environmental matters including public hearings, notification and
consultations, as well as participation in the elaboration and enforcement of laws[.]” 314 Finally, the Court included
judicial review mechanisms, illustrating the connection between the right to participation and the right to access
justice.315
2. The Escazú Agreement Recognizes the Right to Participation
Article 7 of the Escazú Agreement also protects the right to participation. 316 Article 7(1) of the Escazú Agreement
provides that to ensure this right, States must “implement open and inclusive participation in environmental
decision-making processes.”317 In addition to ensuring that participation is open and inclusive, the Escazú
Agreement also requires that participation be effective and timely and that States must actively facilitate the
participation of vulnerable and directly affected persons. Additional provisions of Article 7 provide detailed
guidelines, discussed here and in the following subsections, for the specific steps States must take to give effect
to this right.
Through two separate provisions,318 the Escazú Agreement clarifies that the right to participation applies to a
broad range of environmental decision-making processes at various points along the timeline for such decisions,
but at a minimum “from the early stages.”319 Article 7(2) requires that States provide the necessary mechanisms
for the public to be able to participate in environmental “decision-making processes, revisions, re-examinations
or updates with respect to projects and activities, and in other processes for granting environmental permits that
have or may have a significant impact on the environment, including where they may affect health.” 320
Additionally, Article 7(3) complements this requirement by extending it to a broader set of decision-making
processes that “have or may have a significant impact on the environment[,]” including “land-use planning,
policies, strategies, plans, programmes, rules and regulations[.]”321
Decision-making processes must be transparent and accountable. When publicizing the decision, States must
also assure access to justice by “includ[ing] [information about] the established procedure to allow the public to
take the relevant administrative and judicial actions.”322 Taken together, these provisions allow the public to hold
the State accountable for violations of the right to participation and the corresponding State obligation to consider
311
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the public’s input when reaching a decision. Independent experts agree that “[t]he opportunity to adjudicate any
claims on the accessibility of information or participatory processes is important for timely adjustments or actions
by public officials.”323
Article 7 of the Escazú Agreement also contains various provisions designed to make public participation more
accessible to vulnerable groups and directed affected individuals, as discussed in more detail below. In addition
to requiring language access for directly affected persons,324 these provisions require States to establish “spaces
for consultation on environmental matters[,]”325 “identify and support persons or groups in vulnerable situations .
. . to engage them . . . in participation mechanisms[,]”326 “guarantee that . . . the rights of indigenous peoples and
local communities are observed[,]” 327 and facilitate the participation of persons who are “directly affected by the
projects or activities that have or may have a significant impact on the environment[.]”328
3. Participation Must be Effective and Timely
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires that Public Participation in Environmental
Decision-Making Processes be Effective and Timely
The Escazú Agreement contains several detailed provisions under Article 7 that require States to ensure the
public can participate in environmental decision-making in an effective and timely manner. These specific
obligations acknowledge the interdependence of timeliness and effectiveness in the context of public
participation, in the sense that if the public does not have an opportunity to participate at the appropriate stage
of decision-making or does not receive necessary information with enough time to be able to participate, its
participation will not be effective. Essentially, these provisions obligate States to put systems in place for the
public to navigate and participate in environmental decision-making processes in an accessible and inclusive
manner.
In recognition of the fact that the public is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the decision taken if it cannot
participate at an early enough stage of the proceedings, 329 Article 7(4) of the Escazú Agreement requires States
to “adopt measures to ensure that the public can participate in the decision-making process from the early stages,
so that due consideration can be given to the observations of the public.” 330 Similarly, to ensure that decisionmaking processes include adequate time for the public to determine whether and how to participate and for their
input to be considered by the decision-maker, Article 7(5) of the Escazú Agreement requires States to establish
procedures for public participation that “provide for reasonable timeframes that allow sufficient time to inform the
public and for its effective participation.”331
Timeliness and effectiveness also affect whether decision-making processes are accessible and inclusive.
Article 7(10) accordingly requires States to create favorable conditions for public participation “that are adapted
to the social, economic, cultural, geographical and gender characteristics of the public.” 332 In recognition of the
additional barriers faced by certain groups, States must go one step further for persons and groups in vulnerable
323
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situations by proactively supporting them to engage in participation processes “in an active, timely and effective
manner.”333 These aspects of State obligations are also discussed in more depth in the following subsection on
inclusive participation.
As discussed in Pillar I: on the right to information, the Escazú Agreement also acknowledges that States must
provide the public with the necessary information at the appropriate time as an essential precondition to the
effective exercise of the right to public participation.334 The Escazú Agreement requires that State authorities
provide information to individuals or groups to notify them of activities that may affect them and to allow them to
effectively engage in participatory processes.335 Article 7(4) acknowledges this connection, requiring that States
must “provide the public with the necessary information in a clear, timely and comprehensive manner, to give
effect to its right to participate in the decision-making process.”336
Article 7(6) outlines the minimum categories of necessary information that States must provide the public with
for participation to be effective.337 Such information must be provided “in an effective, comprehensible and timely
manner[.]”338 To help members of the public decide whether to engage in an environmental decision-making
process, States must describe “the type or nature of the environmental decision under consideration[.]” 339 For
the public to understand how they can participate, States must also identify “the authority responsible for making
the decision and other authorities and bodies involved[,]” 340 as well as the logistical and procedural details of the
decision-making process, “including the date on which the procedure will begin and end . . . and the date and
place of any public consultation or hearing[.]” 341 Finally, the State must enable the public to request additional
information by identifying the appropriate public authority and procedure for making any such requests.342
Article 7(17) provides a detailed list of the types of information States must make public as part of environmental
decision-making processes, in order to ensure that the public can accurately assess the merits, risks, and
alternatives related to the decision under consideration and thereby engage effectively in the decision -making
process.343 These minimum informational requirements include “a description of the area of influence and
physical and technical characteristics of the proposed project or activity;” 344 “a description of the main
environmental impacts of the project or activity and, as appropriate, the cumulative environmental impact;” 345
and “a description of the measures foreseen with respect to those impacts[,]”346 such as potential mitigation or
prevention measures, among several others.347 To ensure that this information is accessible, the State must
provide it “free of charge to the public”348 and also include “a summary . . . in comprehensible, non-technical
language[.]”349
In addition to assuring that participation can take place in time and with the necessary information to be
meaningful, effective participation also requires the public to be able to engage actively and meaningfully in the
proceedings and obliges the State to take the public’s input into account as it reaches a decision. To address
333
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this aspect of effectiveness, Article 7(7) requires States to provide the public with “an opportunity to present
observations[.]”350 It also specifies that, “[b]efore adopting the decision, the relevant public authority shall give
due consideration to the outcome of the participation process.”351 To allow the public to verify whether the State
complied with this obligation, States must publicize environmental decisions “in an effective and prompt
manner”352 and include not only the “grounds and reasons underlying the decision,” 353 but also how the relevant
authority took public input into account.354
b. The Escazú Agreement Could Provide Specific Guidance to the InterAmerican System Regarding Specific Steps States Must Take to Ensure
Effective and Timely Participation in Environmental Decision-Making
The Inter-American Court has primarily addressed the right to timely and effective participation in environmental
decision-making in cases involving the collective property rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, 355 discussed
in more depth in the next subsection on the right to consultation. Certain aspects of these cases only apply in
this specific context, but advocates may be able to combine the principles underlying these judgments with the
more broadly applicable provisions of the Escazú Agreement to strengthen the Inter-American System’s
protection of public participation in environmental decision-making. The Inter-American System’s emphasis on
transparency, accountability, and the democratic process as the core values vindicated by the right to public
participation, provides a promising opening for such arguments. Similarly, advocates may invoke the provisions
of the Escazú Agreement that outline the specific steps that States must take to guarantee effective and timely
public participation in environmental decision-making to guide the Inter-American System in developing more
detailed requirements in this area.
Accordingly, this subsection provides a very brief overview of how the Inter-American System addresses the
effectiveness and timeliness of participation in environmental decision-making as essential components of
indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to consultation. It also discusses the relevant aspects of the Inter-American
Court’s Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights and their likely application in the forthcoming
La Oroya judgment.
Most recently, in Nuestra Tierra v. Argentina, the Court affirmed the right to timely and effective participation in
environmental matters, although still within the specific context of indigenous peoples’ collective property
rights.356 The Court acknowledged that the State’s lack of effort to effectively control illegal deforestation of
Lhaka Honhat territory and its failure to comply with environmental and social impact assessment requirements
or to consult adequately with the affected peoples led to human rights violations. 357 The inability of the Lhaka
Honhat to voice their concerns in the decision-making process when development of their native territory was at
stake amounted to a violation of their right to effective participation. 358 Specifically, the State needed to “make
a prior environmental impact assessment” before granting any concessions359 and consult with the Lhaka Honhat
in a way that “ensure[s] the effective participation of the affected peoples or communities, in conformity with their
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customs and traditions, [which] . . . requires the State to receive and provide information and also to ensure
constant communication between the parties.”360
In Saramaka, the Court outlined that States must take specific steps to assure the effectiveness and timeliness
of indigenous peoples’ participation in consultation processes. First, effective participation requires the State to
ensure that the affected peoples “are aware of possible risks, including environmental and health risks, in order
that the proposed [activity] is accepted knowingly and voluntarily.” 361 States must also “actively consult with [the
affected] community according to their customs and traditions[,]” 362 and, in doing so, “take account of the
[affected] people’s traditional methods of decision-making.”363 With regard to timeliness, States must consult the
affected peoples “at the early stages of a development or investment plan, not only when the need arises to
obtain approval from the community, if such is the case.” 364 In subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized Saramaka’s requirement that States must consult with affected peoples early in the process of
development in order for indigenous communities to engage in internal dialogue and effectively participate in
decision-making before the State approves or carries out activities affecting them.365
In addressing the right of indigenous peoples to adequate consultation in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v.
Suriname, the Court affirmed that “the State must . . . put in place mechanisms for the effective participation of
the indigenous peoples using procedures that are culturally adapted to the decision-making of such peoples . . .
[as] part of the exercise of their right to take part in any decision-making on matters that affect their interests, in
accordance with their own procedures and institutions, in relation to Article 23 of the American Convention.” 366
The Court reiterated that States must guarantee “effective participation ‘with regard to any development,
investment, exploration or extraction plan[,] [which includes] any activity that may affect the integrity of the lands
and natural resources[,] [such as] “any proposal related to logging or mining concessions.’”367
These core principles around the right to effective and timely participation in decisions that affect a community’s
rights can be applied more broadly, and Article 7 of the Escazú Agreement offers advocates a relevant, specific
source of normative guidance in this regard. For example, the requirement already established by the InterAmerican Court that for participation to be effective, it must take place at an early stage, is complemented and
strengthened by the more broadly applicable and specific timeliness protections enshrined in Article 7(4) and
7(5).368 This approach could also be used to encourage the Inter-American System to require that the right to
participation also support the public’s ability to avoid environmental harm through preventive measures,
particularly in combination with the Escazú Agreement’s emphasis on the preventive and precautionary
principles, as well as its inclusion of preventive measures in Article 8, 369 discussed in the next section on the
right to access justice.
In a similar vein, the Escazú Agreement’s requirements that States provide the public the opportunity to present
observations and give their input due consideration370 could be raised to give concrete effect to the InterAmerican Court’s pronouncements that “participation is a mechanism for integrating public concerns and
360
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knowledge into public policy decisions affecting the environment[]” 371 and that “[t]he right to participate in
government specifically implies that citizens not only have the right, but also the opportunity, to participate in the
conduct of public affairs[,]”372 The related requirement that public authorities include the grounds for their
decision and describe how they took public input into account when reaching it 373 operates similarly and could
also be incorporated into arguments about what constitutes effective participation in environmental decisionmaking before the Inter-American System.
Likewise, although the Court has until now applied the obligation to adapt consultation and other participatory
processes to the particular needs, cultures, and traditions of indigenous and tribal peoples, by combining this
norm with the Escazú Agreement’s injunction that States adapt participatory processes to “the social, economic,
cultural, geographical and gender characteristics of the public[,]” 374 advocates may persuade the Court to
develop more widely protective standards that require States to take an intersectional and inclusive approach to
public participation in environmental decision-making. The clear and strong requirements in Article 7 that States
must take affirmative steps to facilitate participation by vulnerable groups, indigenous peoples, and directly
affected persons375 are also helpful in this regard. For the marginalized communities that often bear the majority
of environmental harms as one manifestation of multiple layers of structural and historical discrimination, such
an approach could be transformative. The Escazú Agreement’s innovations in these areas may also support
the Inter-American System in continuing to deepen and refine its existing protections for indigenous and tribal
peoples.
The Inter-American System is poised to expand its innovative approach to the right to participation in
environmental decision-making beyond the important but limited context of the cases discussed above. As
mentioned previously, the Court has begun to address the right to participation in environmental matters in its
Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, and its forthcoming judgment in the La Oroya case
will likely provide it with an opening to address what constitutes effective and timely participation in environmental
decision-making processes in a contentious case involving a non-indigenous community. These anticipated
normative developments may also be enhanced in combination with arguments based on the Escazú
Agreement.
As mentioned above, in The Environment and Human Rights, the Court observed that in environmental matters,
“participation is a mechanism for integrating public concerns and knowledge into public policy decisions affecting
the environment.”376 To accomplish this purpose, “public participation requires implementation of the principles
of disclosure and transparency and, above all, should be supported by access to information that permits social
control through effective and responsible participation.” 377 Likewise, effective participation must occur “without
discrimination and in a fair, significant and transparent manner[.]” 378 Finally, participation can only be effective
where “States . . . have previously ensured access to the necessary information[]” 379 and where individuals can
both “play an active role in the planning procedures for activities and projects by expressing their opinions[]” 380
and “challenge official acts or omissions that affect their rights before an independent authority[.]”381 Finally, with
regard to timeliness, in addition to the above point about the prior provision of necessary information, “the State
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must ensure that there are opportunities for effective participation from the initial stages of the decision-making
process, and inform the public about these opportunities for participation.” 382
When the Court issues its judgment in the La Oroya case, it will have the opportunity to apply these standards
to the State’s failure to ensure public participation by a non-indigenous community directly and severely affected
by the significant environmental impacts of a metallurgical complex. 383 In its Merits Report, the Inter-American
Commission found that the State’s failure to provide the community with relevant official information about the
environmental and health impacts of the metallurgical complex not only violated the right to access information
but also prevented the community from exercising “social control” by participating in public governance of the
complex.384
The Court has previously explored this connection between the rights to information and public participation in
Claude-Reyes v. Chile, where the Court interpreted the right to seek and receive information as an essential
quality of effective public participation in environmental decision-making, finding that Chile failed to comply with
its obligation pursuant to Article 13 of the American Convention to provide the public with information regarding
a project with potential environmental impact. 385 The Court held that for States to ensure that public participation
will be effective, the public must have “[a]ccess to State-held information of public interest[.]” 386 It also
emphasized that guaranteeing such access plays a critical role in promoting State transparency and
accountability by enabling public participation in the democratic process, suggesting that effective participation
is hat which allows for individuals to exercise “social control” to influence public administration and “question,
investigate and consider whether public functions are being performed adequately.” 387 This holding implies that
States must provide relevant information in advance of opportunities for public participation and accordingly
informed the Inter-American Court’s declaration in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights
that to fulfill their obligation to guarantee the right to public participation, “States must have previously ensured
access to the necessary information.”388
The Escazú Agreement’s very specific guidelines as to the timing and type of information that States must
provide in environmental decision-making procedures389 could support the Inter-American System in
incorporating similar standards into its existing normative framework. One point of particular importance is Article
7(17)’s requirement that States provide the public with free, comprehensible information not only about the
specific environmental impact of a proposed activity, but also the cumulative environmental impact. This concept
is particularly critical for marginalized communities that often struggle to achieve justice or meaningful remedy
when experiencing disease or other harms caused by the cumulative impact of multiple sources of pollution or
382
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other environmental harms, and the Inter-American System will need to grapple with this aspect of environmental
human rights violations. The combination of the Escazú Agreement’s concrete recognition of the public’s need
to receive and engage actively with this type of information with the Inter-American System’s existing normative
framework could result in powerful, detailed protections to ensure that the public can access essential information
to allow for effective and meaningful participation in a wide range of environmental decision-making processes.
4. States Must Actively Facilitate Inclusive Participation in Environmental DecisionMaking
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires States to Facilitate Inclusive Participation
by Vulnerable Groups and Those Directly Affected by Activities with a
Significant Environmental Impact
In keeping with the Escazú Agreement’s broad commitment to assisting vulnerable groups as well as those
directly affected by environmental decisions to exercise their environmental access rights, 390 Article 7 contains
several provisions aimed at ensuring States take affirmative measures and create durable institutional structures
to support these groups to participate in environmental-decision-making processes. Taken as a whole, they
place an obligation on States to put systems in place for the public – particularly vulnerable groups and directly
affected persons – to navigate participatory processes in an accessible and inclusive way. These provisions
should be interpreted in the context of the Agreement’s overarching goal of “plac[ing] equality at the core of
sustainable development[]”391 and “includ[ing] those that have traditionally been underrepresented, excluded or
marginalized[,]”392 and its requirement that States implement the Agreement in accordance with the pro persona
principle,393 as well as the principles of non-discrimination, equality,394 and good faith.395
Pursuant to Article 7(14) of the Escazú Agreement, States must “make efforts to identify . . . persons or groups
in vulnerable situations[,]”396 and take affirmative measures to support them to engage “in an active, timely and
effective manner in participation mechanisms.”397 To “eliminate barriers to participation,” States must also
consider the development of “appropriate means and formats” for their participation, presumably by making it
simpler and more affordable for them to do so.398 Similarly, with regard to “the public directly affected by the
projects or activities that have or may have a significant impact on the environment[,]” States must take steps to
identify such persons and “promote specific actions to facilitate their participation.”399
Article 7(15) references the extensive legal framework on indigenous peoples’ rights that has already been
developed in the region and the need for the Escazú Agreement to align with that framework.400 Specifically,
States must guarantee that they implement the Escazú Agreement in a way that complies with “domestic
legislation and international obligations in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.” 401
390

Id. at art. 4(5).
António Guterres, Preface to the Escazú Agreement, at p. 5.
392 Alicia Bárcena, Preface to the Escazú Agreement, at p. 8.
393 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3(k).
394 Id. at art. 3(a).
395 Id. at art.. 3(d).
396 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7(14). Pursuant to art. 2(e), the Escazú Agreement defines “Persons or groups in vulnerable
situations” as “those persons or groups that face particular difficulties in fully exercising the access rights recognized in the present
Agreement, because of circumstances or conditions identified within each Party’s national context and in accordance with its international
obligations.” Such groups may include “populations suffering from social exclusion, contemporary sources of disenfranchisement, or
historic systems of oppression[.]” Sarah Dávila A., The Escazú Agreement: The Last Piece of the Tripart Normative Framework in the
Right to a Healthy Environment, 42 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 3 (Forthcoming), p. 28.
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Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7(14).
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399 Id. at art. 7(16).
400 Id. at art. 7(15).
401 Id.
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These provisions add an additional layer of protection for indigenous peoples, who are already included within
the Agreement’s definition of vulnerable groups, by invoking the existing Inter-American and international
normative framework to protect indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights to free, prior, and informed con sultation
and, under some circumstances, consent.402
Although the Agreement does not outline all of the specific steps that States must take to facilitate participation
by these groups, it does provide some detail on the measures States should adopt to eliminate barriers to
participation and adapt decision-making procedures to the particular needs and circumstances of these groups.
For example, as noted above, under Article 7(10), States must “establish conditions that are favourable to public
participation in environmental decision-making processes[.]”403 This provision further requires that States
intentionally design these conditions to account for “the social, economic, cultural, geographical and gender
characteristics of the public.”404 Likewise, Article 7(11) guarantees language access in environmental decisionmaking processes by directing States to ensure that language is not a barrier for directly affected persons who
do not primarily speak the official language(s) by adopting measures “to facilitate their understanding and
participation.”405
Beyond these specific steps, Article 7(13) encourages States to increase the participation of “various groups and
sectors” by establishing or using existing “spaces for consultation on environmental matters[.]” 406 Within such
spaces, States must “promote regard for local knowledge, dialogue and interaction of different views and
knowledge, where appropriate.”407 As discussed below in the context of indigenous peoples, consultation is a
particularly important and empowering way for vulnerable groups and directly affected persons or communities
to engage in environmental decision-making processes that impact them and share their “local knowledge” and
“different views.”408 Consultation may, for example, serve as one of the “specific actions”409 that States must
promote to facilitate the participation of directly affected persons under Article 7(16) or as a way for States to
fulfill their duty under Article 7(10) to “establish conditions that are favourable to public pa rticipation in
environmental decision-making processes[.]”410
b. The Escazú Agreement Could Guide the Inter-American System in
Expanding the Right to Consultation to Non-Indigenous Group
As noted above, the La Oroya case will likely represent the Inter-American Court’s first opportunity to apply its
analysis of the right to public participation in “decision-making and policies that could affect the environment,”411
in a contentious case that does not involve the collective property rights of indigenous peoples.412 Together with
the jurisprudential developments expected from that case, advocates can use the Escazú Agreement provisions
discussed above to encourage the Inter-American System to extend much of its existing normative framework
around indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights to participation and consultation to a broader range of groups,
including persons and groups in a situation of vulnerability or those who are directly affected by activities with an
environmental impact.
The following subsection provides a brief overview of the Inter-American System’s normative framework on indigenous and tribal
peoples’ rights.
403 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7(10).
404 Id.
405 Id. at art. 7(11).
406 Id. at art. 7(13).
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at art. 7(16).
410
Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7(10).
411
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 231.
412 See, La Oroya Community v. Peru, ¶¶154-155, 194, 199-200 (finding that Peru violated the La Oroya community’s rights to information
and participation by failing to provide them with necessary information about the environmental and health impacts of the metallurgical
complex and thereby also preventing them from participating in environmental decisions that directly affected them).
402

42
Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System

Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System
Although the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights to participation and
consultation in decisions affecting their collective property rights derives in part from its understanding of the
specific history, circumstances, needs, and threats pertinent to indigenous and tribal peoples,413 the general
principles articulated in these cases could, in combination with relevant provisions from the Escazú Agreement,
form the basis for a broader understanding of these rights within the Inter-American System. Accordingly, this
section provides a brief discussion of this normative framework and some initial suggestions in this regard.
By jointly reading the rights established in Articles 21 and 23, the Court has interpreted the American Convention
to include the right to prior, free, and informed consultation and under some circumstances, consent, where State
interventions may restrict the collective property rights of indigenous or tribal peoples. 414 Most recently, in
Nuestra Tierra, the Court reaffirmed that the safeguards that States must provide to guarantee indigenous
peoples’ right to collective property “are . . . based on the right of the indigenous peoples to take part in decisions
that affect their rights.”415 The Court reiterated that in this context, the right to consultation partially derives from
the “‘political rights’ relating to participation recognized in Article 23 of the [American] Convention.” 416 To fulfill
this obligation, States must ensure that indigenous peoples are “consulted adequately through institutions that
represent them[,]”417 and that they can participate effectively in such consultations.418 Likewise, States must
structure procedures for prior consultation in accordance with international standards “to create channels for
sustained, effective and reliable dialogue with . . . indigenous communities in consultation and participation
processes through their representative institutions.”419
The Court has repeatedly recognized that consultation is essential to preserve, protect, and guarantee the
special relationship indigenous and tribal peoples have with their lands, as well as their fundamental rights to
cultural identity, cultural survival, and self-determination as peoples.420 In Sarayaku, the Court found that under
Article 21 of the American Convention, States have a “positive obligation to adopt special measures to ensure
that members of indigenous and tribal peoples enjoy the full and equal exercise of their right to the lands that
they have traditionally used and occupied[,]”421 including “the obligation to guarantee the right to prior
consultation”422 to prevent harm to an indigenous peoples’ “ancestral territory, or their subsistence and survival
as an indigenous people.”423 In subsequent cases, the Court incorporated Article 23 as an additional legal basis
for the right to participation aspect of consultation,424 holding that States must implement participation
mechanisms “that are culturally adapted to the decision-making of [indigenous peoples]” as “part of their right to
take part in any decision-making on matters that affect their interests, in accordance with their own procedures
and institutions.”425
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See, e.g., Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sec. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 145-147.
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The Court developed this normative framework in the Saramaka case,426 where it held that to comply with the
obligation to consult, States must 1) “ensure the effective participation of the [affected peoples], in conformity
with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment or extraction plan [] within [their]
territory[]” by respecting the right to consultation;427 2) “guarantee the [affected peoples] receive a reasonable
benefit from any such plan within their territory[;]”428 and 3) “ensure that no concession will be issued within the
[affected peoples’] territory unless and until independent and technically capable entities, with the State’s
supervision, perform a prior environmental and social impact assessment.” 429
In Sarayaku, the Court provided detailed guidance for how it would assess whether a State has fulfilled its duty
to consult with indigenous or tribal peoples.430 Specifically, the Court will consider whether the consultation took
place before significant decisions regarding the project have been made, whether the consultation was carried
out in good faith and for the purpose of reaching an agreement, whether the consultation was adequate and
accessible, and whether the consultation was informed, including through the timely preparation and
dissemination of an environmental and social study of the proposed project’s potential impacts. 431 For the Court
to find a consultation to be adequate and accessible, the State must carry it out “using culturally appropriate
procedures” that align with the traditions of the indigenous or tribal peoples in question. 432 States must also
undertake consultation in a manner that can be understood by the affected indigenous or tribal peoples, including
in the language spoken by the majority of community residents, 433 as well as in a time frame that respects the
internal decision-making process of the affected peoples.434
Finally, the Court has held that under certain circumstances, the State has a duty not only to consult but also to
obtain consent from the affected community.435 This heightened obligation is mandatory in cases of “large-scale
development or investment projects that would have a major impact” on the community’s territory and natural
resources.436 As the Court found in Saramaka, under these circumstances, “the State has a duty . . . to obtain
[the indigenous peoples’] free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.” 437 In
analyzing the need for this higher standard, the Court considered the potentially severe human rights effects of
such projects for indigenous peoples, including loss of land and culture, environmental and social harms, “longterm negative health and nutritional impacts as well as, in some cases, harassment and violence.” 438 This
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However, it is worth noting that the Court did not find a violation of Article 23 in the Saramaka judgment, basing the right to consultation
instead within Article 21 in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the American Convention. Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 158.
427 Id. ¶¶ 129, 133; see Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sec. C) No. 245, ¶ 157; Case
of the Triunfo de la Cruz Garífuna Community v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 305, ¶ 156.
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Court also summarized this normative framework in Advisory Opinion 23. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 227.
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438 Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 135 (quoting U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted in accordance with
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consent standard derives from indigenous and tribal peoples’ right to self-determination and is recognized under
international law.439
These standards could be combined with the Escazú Agreement’s specific provisions regarding States’
obligations to take proactive steps to create inclusive, accessible public participation procedures; facilitate the
participation of vulnerable groups, indigenous peoples, and persons directly affected by environmental harm,
and eliminate barriers to such participation.440 For example, they could guide the Inter-American System in
interpreting State obligations under Article 23 of the American Convention to require States to take specific,
affirmative measures to ensure that all vulnerable persons or groups whose rights may be affected by an
environmental decision can participate in the process for making that decision.
Taking this argument one step further, advocates may be able to use the Escazú Agreement’s provision on
consultation441 in combination with the standards laid out here to encourage the Inter-American System to extend
a modified version of these consultation requirements to all vulnerable and directly affected groups. 442 Guided
by the language of Article 7(10), requiring States to adapt participation procedures to the specific characteristics
of the interested public,443 the Inter-American System may adjust its current normative framework to require
States to conduct such consultation in a way that considers from an intersectional perspective the vulnerable
conditions, historical situation of discrimination or disadvantage, particular needs, or risks faced by the particular
groups being consulted. In addition, advocates litigating cases on behalf of indigenous and tribal peop les can
refer to the Escazú Agreement to deepen the existing normative framework protecting their right to consultation;
Article 7(15) of the Escazú Agreement invites just such an interchange.444
5. Conclusion
To conclude, both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize the right to participation. By
incorporating provisions of the Escazú Agreement in their arguments before the institutions of the Inter-American
System, advocates litigating cases of environmental harm can deepen existing protections of the right to
participation in relation to the environment. The next section discusses the right to access justice, which provides
individuals and groups with the ability to seek redress for violations of the rights to access information and to
participation, as well as other rights implicated by environmental harm.
C. Pillar Three: The Right to Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
The right to access justice is the third pillar of the Escazú Agreement.445 This section will provide a legal
framework for the right to access justice in relation to environmental matters, drawing from the Inter-American
System and the Escazú Agreement. The Escazú Agreement provides for redress when human rights are violated
as a result from a State’s failure to comply with environmental obligations.446 The right of access to justice
ensures that judicial and administrative mechanisms are available and accessible to challenge State actions or
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omissions in environmental matters.447 This section will discuss interpretations of the right to access to justice
from legal precedent in the Inter-American System and assess how the specialized protections under the Escazú
Agreement can complement this approach. Specifically, this section focuses on how the EA can be used to
complement and strengthen the obligation States have under the Inter-American System to provide effective,
timely, and affordable access to justice in environmental matters, particularly to vulnerable groups.
1. Recognition of the Right to Access to Justice by the Inter-American System
The Inter-American System recognizes the right to access justice and its salience in the context of environmental
harm. This subsection analyzes the Inter-American Court’s recognition of the right to access justice specifically
in relation to environmental harm in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights and then
provides additional detail on relevant aspects of the Inter-American System’s normative framework around
access to justice.448
Traditionally, the Inter-American System has interpreted Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention jointly to
encompass States’ obligation to provide effective remedies for human rights violations in accordance with due
process guarantees.449 Article 8(1) of the American Convention provides that “[e]very person has the right to a
hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time[.]” 450 These minimum guarantees apply equally “in
the administrative process or in any other procedure whose decisions may affect the rights of persons.”451 Article
25 of the American Convention provides that “[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any
other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental
rights[.]”452 It also requires that to guarantee the right to judicial protection, States must ensure that any person
claiming a remedy will have their rights determined by the competent authority and enforced by the State’s legal
system.453 By reading these two provisions together, the Court has established a right to access justice under
the American Convention that includes the State obligation to investigate 454 and ensure accountability for human
rights violations.455
In the Nuestra Tierra judgment, the Court affirmed the applicability of the right to access justice in the context of
environmental protection.456 The Court noted that it would assess whether the State has fulfilled its obligation to
guarantee effective remedies by “taking into account whether ‘domestic remedies exist that guarantee real
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Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(2).
The Inter-American System has developed an extensive and detailed normative framework on the right to access justice. This toolkit
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access to justice to claim reparation for a violation.’”457 As noted above, the State must also respect due process
guarantees.458 Additionally, the State violates the right to access justice if it fails to provide effective remedies
that give individuals the opportunity to challenge State acts that may have violated their rights even where that
claim does not succeed on the merits, and conversely, the failure of a claim on the merits does not necessarily
imply a violation of the right to access justice.459 Finally, the right to access justice includes a positive obligation
for State authorities to respond to all requests for a remedy “within a reasonable time.” 460
In its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court listed the right “to an
effective remedy” among the procedural rights most strongly implicated in environmental matters461 and
reiterated that, as previously recognized in its jurisprudence, “access to justice is a peremptory norm of
international law.”462 In assessing how States must ensure the rights to life and personal integrity in situations
of environmental harm, the Court concluded that pursuant to Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention,
States must guarantee “access to justice . . . with regard to protection of the environment[.]” 463 The Court
emphasized that in environmental matters, the right to access justice ensures that individuals can call upon the
State to enforce environmental standards and to provide redress, “including remedies and reparation[]” for
human rights violations caused when a State fails to follow or enforce its own environmental rules.464 It also
recognized the interrelationship between the right to access justice and other environmental access rights, noting
that “access to justice guarantees the full realization of the rights to public participation and access to
information[.]”465
The Court also linked the right to access justice to its broader discussion of States’ obligation of prevention in
the Advisory Opinion, observing that this duty encompasses measures to investigate human rights violations,
punish those responsible, and ensure compensation to the victims.466 States must “supervise and monitor
activities within their jurisdiction that may cause significant damage to the environment[]”467 through “adequate
independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms.” 468 Such “mechanisms must not only include preventive
measures, but also appropriate measures to investigate, punish and redress possible abuse through effective
policies, regulations and adjudication.”469
2. Recognition of the Right to Access to Justice by the Escazú Agreement
Article 8 of the Escazú Agreement addresses the right to access to justice in environmental matters. Specifically,
Art. 8(1) requires States Parties to “guarantee the right of access to justice in environmental matters in
accordance with the guarantees of due process.”470 While the provisions of Article 8 echo many elements of the
existing normative framework on access to justice within the Inter-American System, they offer important
457
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guidance for the specific application of this right to the context of environmental harm and to the enforcement of
the other procedural rights recognized in the Escazú Agreement.
Throughout Article 8, the Escazú Agreement addresses the right to access justice not only to redress
environmental harm that has already occurred but also to ensure recourse to mechanisms aimed at preventing
potential environmental harm. This aspect of the treaty recognizes the importance of the right to access justice
in giving effect to several of its guiding principles, predominantly the preventive principle, 471 the precautionary
principle,472 and the principle of intergenerational equity. 473 Most importantly, Article 8(3)(d) requires that to
prevent, mitigate, or repair harm to the environment, States must provide for precautionary or other measures.474
Article 8(2) requires States to guarantee “access to judicial and administrative mechanisms to challenge and
appeal” violations of the other environmental access rights protected by the Agreement as well any other State
act or omission with actual or potential negative environmental effects or that violates environmental laws or
regulations.475 These procedural protections ensure that individual and communities have access to justice
when they face barriers in receiving environmental information or participating in environmental decision-making
processes, as well as any actual or potential violation of substantive human rights affected by environmental
harm. By defining the types of actions subject to review broadly and by including not only definite environment
harm but also potential harm, these provisions provide the public with powerful tools to seek preventive measures
and to overcome State resistance to taking action before the risk of harm has been scientifically proven.476
Under Article 8(3), the Agreement enumerates specific steps that States must take to guarantee access to
justice, which have particular resonance for communities that have historically struggled to vindicate their
environmental rights.477 States are obligated to invest in competent State entities with environmental
expertise.478 They must also provide affordable, “effective, timely, public, transparent and impartial
procedures[.]”479 Persons and groups must be granted legal standing to bring claims regarding harms to the
environment.480 In recognition of the technical complexity inherent in environmental protection and the barriers
the public may face in producing such evidence, States must establish the means of producing “evidence of
environmental damage[.]”481
Article 8(4) sets forth the measures States must undertake to facilitate access to justice. Specifically, States
must reduce or eliminate barriers to access to justice.482 They must also publicize both the existence of the right
to access justice as well as the procedures or mechanisms the State has made available to give effect to the
right.483 Similarly, States must create a system to organize relevant judicial and administrative decisions and
make them publicly accessible.484 This requirement relates to the obligation in Article 8(6) that environmental
decisions and the legal reasoning supporting them be made in writing. 485
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In recognition that achieving enforcement of environmental rights decisions represents another potential barrier
to accessing justice, the Agreement further requires that State enforcement of judicial decisions be timely. 486 It
also directs States to provide comprehensive reparations, including restoration, compensation, “assistance for
affected persons[,]” and other forms of redress.487
All of these provisions ensure that when an individual or community experiences human rights violations caused
by actual or threatened environmental harm, or by related violations of other environmental access rights, the
State has provided the means for them to navigate judicial and administrative mechanism to seek redress. 488
Article 8(7) commits States to “promote . . . alternative dispute resolution mechanisms . . . [to] allow
[environmental] disputes to be prevented or resolved.”489
3. Access to Justice Must be Effective
Both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize that a core element of the right to access
justice is that measures to provide access to justice must be effective. The Inter-American Court has begun to
consider what factors it might look to when assessing the effectiveness of access to justice mechanisms in the
context of the right to a healthy environment, but the specialized provisions of the Escazú Agreement could
contribute significantly to the development of the law in this area. 490
a. The Escazú Agreement Specifies How States Must Design Justice
Mechanisms to Assure Their Effectiveness in Environmental Matters
As noted above, the Escazú Agreement affirms that, to guarantee access to justice, States must ensure that
available procedures are effective.491 Other provisions of Article 8 inform the content of this requirement as
applied to the specific context of environmental matters and reflect the understanding that for justice mechanisms
to be effective in this context, the State must equip them with appropriate abilities and tools. For example, Article
8(3)(a) requires States to establish “competent State entities with access to expertise in environmental matters[,]”
recognizing that for mechanisms providing access to justice in environmental matters to be effective, the relevant
State entities must be capable of handling complex matters with the assistance of technical experts who can
ensure that these mechanisms operate consistently with available science. 492 Likewise, the requirement that
State mechanisms have the power to order precautionary measures to prevent environmental harm 493 reflects
another essential component of effective access to justice in environmental matters, as does the requirement
that States support the generation of environmental evidence.494
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Similarly, the requirement that States empower justice mechanisms to order broad reparations to redress
environmental harm and related human rights violations contributes to the Escazú Agreement’s
conceptualization of what constitutes effective access to justice.495 This provision supports the understanding
that in the context of environmental matters, simple monetary damages cannot provide sufficient redress for the
range of harms likely to be at stake. The express direction to include “restitution to the condition prior to the
damage[]” and “restoration” acknowledge the unique types of redress necessary in matters of environmental
rights violations.496
The emphasis on timely execution and enforcement of judicial and administrative decisions, enshrined in Article
8(3)(f), likewise informs the analysis of what States must do to assure the effectiveness of access to justice
mechanisms under the Escazú Agreement.497 If States do not ensure the enforcement of domestic judgments,
then the public has no meaningful avenue to vindicate their environmental rights or prevent environmental harm.
b. The Escazú Agreement Can Be Used to Strengthen the Inter-American
System’s Normative Framework on Effective Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters
Within the Inter-American System, the existing normative framework requires that for States to ensure access to
justice, mechanisms must be effective and adequate for their purpose. 498 The specialized guidance of the
Escazú Agreement provides a helpful tool for applying this existing framework to the specific context of cases of
environmental rights violations and thereby enhancing protections in this area.
Article 25(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights expressly enshrines “the right to . . . effective recourse
. . . for protection against” human rights violations.499 The Inter-American Court has consistently held that this
provision obligates States to “ensure a simple, prompt and effective judicial remedy before a competent judge
or court[]”500 and that “this remedy must be adequate and effective.”501 The Court grounds its understanding of
the effectiveness of judicial remedies in the need for international human rights law to protect individuals from
“the arbitrary exercise of public authority”502 and the recognition that “[t]he inexistence of effective domestic
recourses places the individual in a state of defenselessness.”503
To meet the effectiveness requirement, the remedy must be able to fulfill its purpose, that is, to determine
whether a human rights violation has occurred and provide redress.504 Likewise, to be considered adequate, the
remedy must be “suitable to address the infringement of a legal right.”505 In analyzing the relationship between
Article 25(1) and the due process guarantees of Article 8(1) of the American Convention, the Court has also
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found that for remedies to be effective, they must comport with those due process guarantees. 506 Additionally,
remedies may not be illusory, such as where judicial bodies lack competence, independence, or impartiality. 507
The Court has also found judicial remedies ineffective where individuals, due to State interference, cannot
access such remedies in any way.508 Finally, the Court has considered remedies ineffective where judicial bodies
lack “the means to carry out [their] judgments[,]” 509 and has found violations of Art. 25(1) and 25(2)(c) in relation
to Art. 1(1) where States failed to comply with domestic judgments to vindicate human rights violations.510
Although, as noted above, the Inter-American Court reaffirmed in the Nuestra Tierra judgment that it would apply
this effectiveness requirement to an access to justice violation alleged in a case involving environmental harm,
it did not conduct a detailed analysis of what its current normative framework requires to consider a remedy
effective in this context. 511 In this regard, the Escazú Agreement provisions discussed in this section have the
potential to fill a critical gap and could inform the pronouncement of more specific State obligations to ensure the
effectiveness of justice mechanisms in environmental matters. By giving detailed content to the powers and
resources that States must build into judicial remedies in environmental matters, the Escazú Agreement can
guide the Inter-American System in applying the effectiveness requirement to environmental human rights cases.
The Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile is also instructive. In that case, the Inter-American Court found that
Chile failed to provide vulnerable individuals with effective judicial recourse to vindicate the righ t to information
after State officials refused to inform affected populations of the planned deforestation. 512 Specifically, the Court
held that when the State refuses access to State-held information, it must ensure the availability of “a simple,
prompt and effective recourse that permits determining whether there has been a violation of the right of the
person requesting information and, if applicable, that the corresponding body is ordered to disclose that
information.”513 It also found that pursuant to Article 25(2)(b) of the American Convention, if a State does not
provide a population with effective methods to protect rights through judicial recourse, it must promptly establish
such a method.514 Finally, it found the judicial remedy in this case ineffective both because it failed to determine
whether the right to information had been violated 515 and because it did not comport with the due process
obligation under Art. 8(1) of the American Convention that when domestic bodies adopt decisions “that that could
affect human rights[,]”516 they must do so through “a duly justified written decision.”517
The Court applied a similar approach in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, which involved violations of an
indigenous peoples’ collective property rights. As part of their efforts to pursue land claims, they sought Stateheld “information [that] could have provided them with additional evidence when filing their claims in the domestic
jurisdiction.”518 The Court held that “the failure to hand over information in Suriname’s public records, and the
506
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failure to justify the refusal to provide it” constituted a violation of both the right to information under Article 13 of
the American Convention, as well as the right to judicial protection under Article 25.519
The standards articulated in these judgments also suggest avenues for advocates to use the Escazú Agreement
to deepen the Inter-American System’s understanding of how a violation of the right to access information
connects to the right to access justice. For example, the requirement in Article 8(6) that environmental decisions
and the legal justifications for the decision reached be issued in writing520 clarifies how the standard set forth in
Claude-Reyes applies to environmental matters. Similarly, Article 8(2)(a) makes explicit that States must provide
broad access to justice for “any decision, action or omission related to the access to environmental information[,]”
which could be used to build upon how the Court analyzed effectiveness in Claude-Reyes.
Finally, the Inter-American System has also found that for judicial remedies to be effective, States must also
guarantee compliance with domestic judgments, in a way that assures effective protection of the rights found to
have been violated.521 Failure to do so constitutes a violation of Article 25 of the American Convention in relation
to Article 1(1) of the same instrument.522 Towards this end, States must establish “effective mechanisms to
execute . . . [domestic] judgments, so that the declared rights are protected effectively[,]” 523 including where such
judgments rule against State authorities.524 The enforcement of domestic judgments will only be considered
effective if it takes place in a way that is consistent with the underlying principles of judicial protection established
by the Inter-American System – due process, legal certainty, judicial independence, and the rule of law525 – and
all public entities have the obligation to facilitate the execution of judgments. 526
Several provisions of the Escazú Agreement offer guidance for how the Inter-American System can deepen this
aspect of access to justice in environmental matters, where enforcement of judgments has critical significance.
Article 8(3)(f) provides an unambiguous statement of this requirement, obligating States to adapt their domestic
legal systems to include “mechanisms to execute and enforce judicial and administrative decisions in a timely
manner[.]”527 Related provisions, such as the requirements under Article 8(3)(d) that States provide “the
possibility of ordering precautionary and interim measures, inter alia, to prevent, halt, mitigate or rehabilitate
damage to the environment[]”528 and Article 8(3)(g), which obligates States to ensure comprehensive, restorative
reparations in situations of environmental harm,529 build upon this foundational requirement and give content to
what constitutes the effective execution of judgments in environmental cases.
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4. Access to Justice Must be Timely
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires that Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters be Timely
The Escazú Agreement requires States to ensure that procedures are “timely”530 and take place “in accordance
with the guarantees of due process.”531 It also obligates States to create “mechanisms to execute and enforce
judicial and administrative decisions in a timely manner[.]”532
b. The Escazú Agreement Can be Used to Strengthen the Inter-American
System’s Normative Framework on Timely Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters
Under the normative framework of the Inter-American System on access to justice, States must ensure that
access to justice for ongoing or imminent human rights violations be prompt 533 and that judicial proceedings
occur within a reasonable time.534 When analyzing the right to access justice under Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court has concluded that because “the right to
access to justice implies that the controversy be solved within a reasonable time[,] an extended delay may
constitute, in itself, a violation of the judicial guarantees.”535 A lack of State response536 or excessive delay in
carrying out an investigation or other legal remedy can also undermine the effectiveness of that remedy. 537
Likewise, the Court in Nuestra Tierra held that “the obligation to provide adequate and effective judicial remedies
signifies that the proceedings must be held within a reasonable time.”538
However, the Court has primarily grounded its assessment of the timeliness of access to justice within Article
8(1) of the American Convention, and it has applied these requirements to “civil, labor, criminal or any other
jurisdiction[.]”539 In the context of legal proceedings to determine indigenous peoples’ land rights, the InterAmerican Court has also recognized that, pursuant to Article 8(1), “one of the elements of due process is that
actions to determine the rights of individuals under . . . any . . . jurisdiction must be conducted within a reasonable
time.”540 Advocates can point to the similarity between the timeliness and due process requirements of the
530
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Escazú Agreement and those of Article 8(1) of the American Convention to argue that the Inter-American System
should extend its understanding of these requirements 541 to proceedings that can affect environmental rights.
Although the Court generally assesses the duration of the proceedings as a whole, beginning with “the first
procedural act[,]”542 at times it will separately evaluate each stage.543 In administrative procedures, the Court
considers the overall duration beginning with the initial act that sets the administrative process in motion, such
as the submission of a claim, rather than looking only to the beginning of subsequent judicial proceedings. 544
The Court has also found that the right of access to justice requires that enforcement of a judgment take pla ce
within a reasonable time.545 The broad definition of the types of proceedings covered by the Escazú Agreement’s
access to justice provisions546 can be used to guide the Inter-American System in both applying the “reasonable
time” standard broadly to the different stages of environmental matters, as mentioned above, but also to include
initial decisions or other preliminary steps in that analysis.
As the Court reaffirmed in Nuestra Tierra, the Inter-American System determines what constitutes reasonable
time by looking at four factors: “(i) the complexity of a matter; (ii) the procedural activity of the interested party;
(iii) the conduct of the judicial authorities; and (iv) the effects on the legal situation of the person involved in the
proceedings.”547 The Court added the fourth factor due to its concern for the adverse impacts of delay and has
indicated that “[i]f the passage of time has a relevant impact on the judicial situation of the individual, the
proceedings should be carried out more promptly so that the case is decided as soon as possible.”548
The Court places on the State the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the time taken to resolve
proceedings.549 In cases involving a lengthy process, the Court has held that “a protracted delay . . . constitutes
in itself a violation of the right to fair trial[,]”550 unless the State can show “that the delay is directly related to the
complexity of the case or to the conduct of the parties involved.” 551 Where the State does not provide a
justification for a significant delay, the Court does not need to apply the above criteria and instead will
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547 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 301, note 308 (citing Case of Ramírez Escobar et al. v. Guatemala, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 351 ¶ 257, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 373, ¶ 118). Note that the Court sometimes lists these factors in a different order, as in Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous
Community. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 133.
548
Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, ¶ 155 (Nov. 27, 2008).
549
Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 333, ¶
218 (Feb. 16, 2017).
550 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 88.
551 Id.
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automatically find a violation of the right to access justice.552 For example, in Nuestra Tierra, the Court found
Argentina responsible for a violation of Article 8(1) of the American Convention where the State provided no
justification for a three-year delay in the proceedings at issue.553 The Escazú Agreement’s requirement that
States guarantee the timeliness of procedures in environmental matters554 can be used to bolster the continued
application of this standard to environmental rights cases before the Inter-American System.
i. Complexity
With regard to the first factor, although the Court has found many types of situations as complex, including the
restoration of indigenous territories, it rarely finds a lengthy delay in such cases to be justified simply by their
complexity.555 Instead, where the delays have been caused by “the deficient and delayed actions of the State
authorities[,]”556 rather than the complexity of the matter at hand, the Court is more likely to find a violation. 557
This aspect of the Court’s analysis is particularly important in the context of environmental matters, which are
likely to be complex. When combined with the Escazú Agreement’s specific injunction that States ensure “timely”
procedures in environmental matters, advocates can argue that this aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence should
prevent States from using the complexity of environmental cases as an excuse for unreasonable delay or
inaction.
ii. Activity of the Interested Party
For the second factor, the Court will look at whether the interested party actively engaged with the proceeding
and complied with their obligations to move the process forward, taking State-caused barriers into account.558
In the context of administrative proceedings to restore indigenous land rights, the Court considered that the
community took affirmative steps to initiate activities within the proceedings. 559 Advocates could use the Escazú
Agreement’s provisions that enhance the public’s ability to exercise the right to access justice to argue that this
factor should weigh in favor of alleged victims where the States fail to comply with these requirements and
thereby impede their ability to proactively engage in the proceedings. Specifically, the provisions requiring States
to ensure “broad active legal standing in defence of the environment[,]” 560 establish “measures to minimize or
eliminate barriers to the exercise of the right of access to justice[,]” 561 and guarantee that proceedings are
transparent562 could be used to support this argument.
iii. Conduct of State Authorities
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Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶¶ 301-302 (citing Case of Bayarri v. Argentina. Preliminary objection, merits,
reparations, and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 187, ¶ 107 (Oct. 30, 2008); Case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v.
Venezuela. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 293, ¶ 255 (Jun. 22, 2015), and Case
of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Inter-A. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 354, ¶ 422 (Apr. 25,
2018).
553 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 302.
554 Escazú Agreement, art. 8(1).
555 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sec. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 87-89; Case of Valle Jaramillo et
al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, ¶156 (Nov. 27, 2008); Case of the Moiwana
Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶¶ 160-162 (Jun.
15, 2005).
556 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 134
557 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 88.
558 Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 161; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v.
Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 185 (Jan. 31, 2006).
559
Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Inter-A. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 135.
560 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(3)(c).
561 Id. at art. 8(4)(a).
562 Id. at art. 8(3)(b).
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With regard to the conduct of State authorities, the third factor, the Court scrutinizes the diligence with which the
State carried out the procedures in question,563 typically with detailed reference to relevant domestic law564 and,
where appropriate, reference to patterns of delay or impunity.565 As noted above, in Xákmok Kasek Indigenous
Community, the Court assigned particular weight to this factor in attributing procedural delays primarily to “the
passiveness, inactivity, insufficient diligence, and lack of response of the State authorities.” 566 However, the
Court has at times found the duration of the proceedings reasonable where the State demonstrated its diligence
in pursuing a complex case,567 or where a combination of a relatively short duration, some State activity, and a
lack of evidence as to the other factors persuades the Court that the time is reasonable. 568 Advocates can point
to the detailed access to justice provisions of the Escazú Agreement569 to give specific content about the types
of activities States must conduct in environmental proceedings in order to demonstrate diligence under this
factor.
iv. Effects on the Person(s) Involved
Finally, as noted above, the fourth factor directs the Court to consider whether, given the situation of the alleged
victim and rights at issue, a delay in the proceedings might cause harm that should have led the State to ensure
prompt resolution of the matter.570 In Xákmok Kasek Indigenous Community, the Court found that the duration
of administrative proceedings to determine the land rights of an indigenous community was not reasonable, in
part because the delay in resolving the indigenous community’s land claims “had a direct effect on their living
conditions.”571 Similarly, in Furlan, the Court found that the adverse effects of delayed proceedings were
exacerbated by the vulnerable condition of alleged victims with disabilities, concluding that the State should have
exercised “a higher degree of diligence”572 and that its failure to do so violated the reasonable time
requirement.573
This aspect of the Inter-American System’s understanding of reasonable time complements the Escazú
Agreement’s clear emphasis on the importance of prevention in environmental matters. Delay in the resolution
of environmental proceedings typically implicates some of the most basic human rights, including the rights to
life and humane treatment, as discussed extensively in the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion on The
Environment and Human Rights.574 Partially in recognition of this fact, as well as the frequent impossibility of
environmental restoration,575 the Escazú Agreement has incorporated the preventive principle,576 the
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Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 88; Case of the Xákmok Kásek
Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 134.
564 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 65-77, 84-88.
565 Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 211, ¶¶ 134-135 (Nov. 24, 2009); Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
214, ¶ 137.
566 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser.
C) No. 214 ¶134 (Aug. 24, 2010).
567 Case of Luna López v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶¶ 192-193, 196.
568 Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 284, ¶¶ 177, 184-186 (the Court analyzed four proceedings separately and found three of them to violate the reasonable
time requirement, with the exception of a three-year criminal proceeding where no evidence justified an expedited proceeding and the
State had begun investigations).
569 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(3). See also the discussion on the obligation of prevention, above.
570 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, ¶ 155; Case of Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi
and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 180.
571 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 136.
572 Case of Furlan and family v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶
202 (Aug 31, 2012).
573
Case of Furlan and family v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶¶ 201-204.
574 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, pp. 44-90.
575 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, ¶ 130.
576 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3(e).
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precautionary principle,577 and the principle of intergenerational equity 578 into the obligations undertaken by
States Parties. These principles, in addition to the explicitly preventive provisions of Article 8 of the Escazú
Agreement discussed in the preceding subsection,579 can be used to argue that the Inter-American System
should place particular weight on this fourth factor in environmental rights cases, especially those involving
delays in the resolution of preventive proceedings.
In a case involving labor rights violations, the Court held that “[d]elay in executing a judgment may not be such
as to allow that . . . the right protected by the judgment be adversely affected.” 580 In that case, the Court also
rejected the State’s argument that it was unable to execute the judgment due to budget issues, finding that
“[b]udget regulations may not be used as an excuse for many years of delay in complying with the judgments.581
As noted above, the Escazú Agreement’s clear requirement that the State ensure timely execution of
environmental decisions582 can be used to argue that the Inter-American System should apply these
requirements to environmental rights cases, including the point that all forms of redress must be enforced in a
timely manner. To this end, the Agreement’s provision on redress also supports the argument that timely
enforcement should include preventive and restorative measures as well as financial compensation not only to
affected individuals but potentially also in the form of trust funds designed to support an entire community or
ecosystem affected or threatened by environmental harm.583
5. Access to Justice Must be Affordable
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires that Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters be Affordable
Included in its guarantees around the right to access justice, the Escazú Agreement requires that proceedings
be affordable. Not only does the Escazú Agreement generally require States to “minimize or eliminate barriers
to the exercise of the right of access to justice[,]” 584 which presumably includes cost, Article 8(3)(b) requires
States to provide “effective, timely, public, transparent and impartial procedures that are not prohibitively
expensive.”585 Additionally, Article 8(5) provides that States must “meet the needs of persons or groups in
vulnerable situations by establishing support mechanisms, including, as appropriate, free technical and legal
assistance[]” to give effect to access to justice.586
Additional requirements within Article 8 of the Escazú Agreement, though not mentioning cost explicitly, also
require States to undertake some of the high-cost components of environmental litigation. These requirements
include the obligation to establish “the use of interpretation or translation[,]” 587 to “facilitate the production of
evidence of environmental damage,”588 and to ensure that State authorities have “access to expertise in
environmental matters[.]”589 These provisions suggest that States may be responsible for the costs of these
elements of environmental litigation, rather than the affected individuals or communities.
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Id. at art. 3(f).
Id. at art. 3(g).
579 Id. at art. 8(3)(d, g).
580 Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 144, ¶ 225.
581 Id.
582 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(3)(f).
583 Id. at art. 8(3)(g).
584 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(4)(a).
585
Id. at art. 8(3)(b).
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Id. at art. 8(5).
587 Id. at art. 8(4)(d).
588 Id. at art. 8(3)(e).
589 Id. at art. 8(3)(a).
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b. The Escazú Agreement Can be used to Strengthen the Inter-American
System’s Normative Framework on the Affordability of Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters
The Inter-American System also requires that access to justice be affordable but has not yet explored the details
of this requirement in the context of environmental rights cases. The Escazú Agreement may provide helpful
guidance in this regard.
The Inter-American Court addressed the need to ensure affordability of access to justice in Advisory Opinion
OC-11/90 on Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies.590 The Court stated that Article 1 of the
American Convention prohibits States from discriminating against individuals on the grounds of economic
status.591 Persons who cannot afford the costs associated with legal or judicial proceedings are considered to
be “discriminated against by reason of his economic status[.]” 592 In criminal proceedings, States may violate
Article 8 of the American Convention where “the accused is forced to defend himself because he cannot afford
legal counsel[]” and can prove “that the lack of legal counsel affected the right to a fair hearing[.]” 593 In civil or
other kinds of cases, the Court has found that the due process guarantees of Article 8 may also require States
to provide legal counsel where “the circumstances of a particular case or proceeding”594 indicate that “legal
representation is . . . necessary for a fair hearing.”595 The Escazú Agreement’s clear direction that States provide
vulnerable groups with support including “free technical and legal assistance[]” 596 may be used to clarify that in
environmental matters pursued by vulnerable groups, the Inter-American System could find support for technical
and legal assistance necessary to comport with the due process guarantees of Article 8 of the American
Convention in conjunction with the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of economic status in Article 1.
In the Case of Cantos v. Argentina, the Inter-American Court found a violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American
Convention where Argentina demanded that, to pursue his case, Mr. José María Cantos pay approximately
140,000,000 pesos in filing fees, fines accrued from failure to pay initial filing fees within five days, attorneys and
expert fees, and interest.597 The Court held that “[t]he right of access to a court of law cannot be denied because
of filing fees[,]”598 and made similar findings as to regulated attorney’s fees599 and expert fees.600 It concluded
that States violate the right to access justice where the costs involved cause the interested party to “fear . . .
being forced to pay disproportionate or excessive sums because they turned to the courts.” 601 Accordingly, the
Court pronounced that procedural costs required to access and navigate judicial mechanisms must be
reasonable602 and limits placed on the right of access to the courts, including fees, must be proportional to the
aim sought.603
590

Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights).
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, supra note 11, ¶¶ 20-31.
591 Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, supra note 11, ¶ 22. Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11 ¶22 (Aug. 10, 1990)
592 Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, supra note 11 ¶ 22.
593 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights).
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.11, ¶27. (Aug. 10, 1990)
594 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights).
Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.11, ¶27. (Aug. 10, 1990), supra note 11 at ¶ 28.
595 Id.
596 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(5).
597 Case of Cantos v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 97, ¶ 70; see also ¶ 50 (finding that “[a]ny domestic law or measure that
imposes costs or in any other way obstructs individuals’ access to the courts and that is not warranted by what is reasonably needed for
the administration of justice must be regarded as contrary to Article 8(1) of the Convention.”) and para. 52 (finding that “[a]ny law or
measure that obstructs or prevents persons from availing themselves of the recourse in question is a violation of the right of access to
the courts,” pursuant to Article 25 of the American Convention).
598 Case of Cantos v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 97, ¶ 54.
599
Id. ¶ 56.
600
Id. ¶ 62.
601 Id. ¶ 55.
602 Id. ¶ 62.
603 Id. ¶ 54.
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The affordability provisions of the Escazú Agreement clarify that the Inter-American System should apply this
normative framework in the context of environmental matters and find violations of the right to access justice
where States impose excessive costs in such cases. The specific provisions that assign State responsibility for
some of the more costly aspects of environmental proceedings could be used to guide the Inter-American System
in applying this framework to costs associated with the production of environmental evidence and the
interventions of environmental experts, for example, thereby deepening the Inter-American System’s affordability
protections for access to justice in environmental matters. In this vein, although a State may argue that it must
impose higher fees in environmental cases that require it to spend more to produce environmental evidence or
engage environmental experts, litigants could point to the provisions of the Escazú Agreement to show that
States must bear these costs and that the proportionality analysis applied by the Inter-American Court in Cantos
does not excuse this obligation.
6. States Must Assure Access to Justice for Vulnerable Groups
a. The Escazú Agreement Requires States to Facilitate Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters for Vulnerable Groups
As discussed further in Section V, the Escazú Agreement commits States to take affirmative steps, including
through the provision of “guidance and assistance” to ensure that “persons or groups in vulnerable situations”
can meaningfully exercise their environmental access rights. 604 In keeping with the Agreement’s overall
commitment to ensuring that vulnerable persons or groups can exercise their environmental access rights, Article
8(5) requires States to create support mechanisms to help vulnerable groups access justice, including through
the provision of “free technical and legal assistance.” 605 This provision recognizes that vulnerable groups face
heightened barriers to access justice and may need assistance to enforce their rights. 606 States must also
facilitate access to justice by providing interpretation or translation in non-official languages as needed.607
A suite of other provisions can be interpreted to give further scope to State obligations regarding access to justice
for vulnerable groups when read in combination with the Agreement’s commitment to the “[p]rinciple of equality
and principle of non-discrimination[,]”608 the pro persona principle609 and the related requirement that States
“adopt the most favourable interpretation for the full enjoyment of and respect for the access rights when
implementing the . . . Agreement.”610 For example, the provision requiring States to give “broad legal standing
in defence of the environment[]”611 should expand the ability of vulnerable groups to engage in proceedings that
affect them. Likewise, the requirements that States undertake “measures to minimize or eliminate barriers to
the exercise of the right of access to justice”612 and allow for protective measures613 should apply with heightened
force to vulnerable groups, who may face greater barriers and experience more significant harms where the
State fails to prevent environmental damage. Similarly, a joint reading suggests that States should take particular
care to ensure adequate reparations that meet the unique needs of vulnerable groups, pursuant to the guarantee
of broad measures of redress in Article 8(3)(g).614
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b. The Escazú Agreement can be used to Strengthen the Inter-American
System’s Normative Framework on Access to Justice by Vulnerable Groups
in Environmental Matters
Although the Inter-American System requires States to consider vulnerability when providing access to justice,
advocates can strengthen these existing protections by pointing to the specific provisions of the Escazú
Agreement that obligate States to take affirmative steps to facilitate access to justice for vulnerable groups.
The Inter-American System takes an intersectional approach in ensuring that vulnerable groups enjoy equal
access to justice and requires States to take victims’ identities or vulnerabilities into account when ensuring
meaningful access to justice.615 Furthermore, States must adapt procedural requirements to the situation of
vulnerable persons and groups and ensure they have equal access to justice without discrimination. 616 More
generally, States owe a heightened duty of protection towards groups facing discrimination and must “adopt
positive measures to reverse any discriminatory situations that exist in their societies that affect a specific group
of persons.”617
The Inter-American System has applied this approach to the specific situations of different vulnerable groups,
including persons with disabilities,618 undocumented migrants, and women. In Furlan, the Court held that States
must apply “a higher degree of diligence”619 to avoid delay in the resolution of proceedings in recognition of the
vulnerability of persons with disabilities to delay or other barriers to effective access to justice. 620 The Court has
also required States to recognize the vulnerability of undocumented migrants and ensure equal access to justice
regardless of migratory status.621 With regard to gender, the Court has also recognized that States must
guarantee access to justice in a way that takes into account the intersectional vulnerability experienced by
women, particularly in the context of violence against women. 622
The Court has also developed an extensive line of jurisprudence requiring States to account for the vulnerability
of indigenous peoples in ensuring access to justice, particularly in the context of land rights. For example, in
Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano v. Panama, the InterAmerican Court found a violation of the right to access justice because the administrative procedures available
to the communities to challenge violations of their rights “did not obtain a response that permitted an adequate
determination of their rights and obligations.”623 The Court emphasized that to comply with Article 25 of the
615

Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Inter-Am Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 167; Case of Furlan and Family v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶¶ 201-202.
616 Case of Furlan and family v. Argentina, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 268; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations
and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶ 97 (Nov. 26, 2008); Case of the Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic.
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 240 (Sep. 8, 2005) (but note that the Court
declined to rule on the access to justice claims before it in this case because the facts giving rise to these claims occurred before the
Dominican Republic accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, see ¶ 201).
617 Case of the Afro-descendant Communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia. Preliminary
objections, merits, reparations and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶ 332 (Nov. 20, 2013); Juridical Condition and Rights of the
Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., supra note 18, at ¶ 104.
618 See also Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 99 (holding that States have heightened obligations
of protection, including to investigate and sanction abuses, towards persons with disabilities in private mental health institutions).
619 Case of Furlan and Family v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 202.
620 Id. ¶¶ 201-202.
621 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, supra
note 18 at ¶¶ 107, 159; see also Due Process in Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status and Statelessness and the Granting
of Complementary Protection, = Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. Doc. 255 (Aug. 5, 2020), at ¶¶ 98-102.
622 Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 258, 284; Case of Véliz Franco et al. v.
Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 277, ¶ 210 (May 19, 2014); Case of
Digna Ochoa et al. v. México. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 447, ¶ 101 (Nov. 25,
2021).
623 Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 173 (Oct. 14, 2014).

60
Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System

Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System
American Convention, States must ensure these proceedings “take into account [indigenous communities’]
specificities, their economic and social characteristics, as well as their situation of special vulnerability, their
customary law, values, and customs.”624 As the Court held in Yakye Axe, this includes the requirement that
States “provide an effective means with due process guarantees . . . for [indigenous peoples] to claim traditional
lands[.]”625
The Court has also directed States to take affirmative measures to redress discrimination faced by indigen ous
peoples in accessing justice and remove existing barriers that exacerbate their vulnerability. In Saramaka
People v. Suriname, the Court found that the State, by failing to recognize the legal capacity of the Saramaka
people, had “place[d] them in a vulnerable situation where . . . the Saramaka people may not seek, as a juridical
personality, judicial protection against violations of their . . . rights[,]” 626 thereby violating the right to judicial
protection.627 The Court likewise found the State liable for impermissible discrimination in access to justice
against indigenous peoples in Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala,628 holding “that the next of kin of the missing victims faced
obstacles when accessing justice due to the fact that they belonged to the Mayan Indian People.” 629 In that case,
the Court concluded the State should take affirmative measures to guarantee their right to a fair trial without
discrimination and in recognition of the barriers to access justice that they faced as indigenous persons. 630
Specifically, “the State must ensure that they understand and are understood in the legal proceedings . . . offering
them interpreters or other effective means for said purpose.” 631 The Court further required the State to ensure
that the alleged victims did not need to expend excessive effort in order to access the authorities involved and
to “pay an amount for future expenses, as a way of guaranteeing that the victims can act as plaintiffs in the
criminal proceedings[.]”632
The expansive definition of vulnerable groups in the Escazú Agreement combined with its specific directives as
to the affirmative measures that States must undertake to ensure access to justice for such groups can be used
to encourage the Inter-American System to apply its existing protections both more broadly and more forcefully
in the context of environmental harm. For example, advocates may use these provisions to push the InterAmerican System to recognize that additional groups beyond those traditionally recognized as vulnerable require
additional protections to access justice where the presence or threat of environmental harm creates a situation
of vulnerability under the terms of the Escazú Agreement.
Where litigants lack meaningful access to the courts or other procedures, the provision on legal standing offers
a concrete formulation to bolster the Inter-American System’s existing requirements that a lack of juridical
personality (as in the case of indigenous peoples) or discriminatory barriers faced in accessing justice (as in the
case of undocumented migrants) and ensure that all individuals and groups placed in a situation of vulnerability
by environmental harm can enjoy equal access to justice. The other provisions noted above can similarly be
624

Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶ 167 (Oct. 14, 2014); see also Case of the
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sec. C) No. 125, ¶ 63; Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname.
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶178, (Nov. 28, 2007); Case of
Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶96 (Nov. 26, 2008).
625 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sec. C) No. 125, ¶ 96; see also Case of the Saramaka
People. v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶178 (Nov.
28, 2007).
626 Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 172, ¶173 (Nov. 28, 2007).
627 Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 172, ¶175 (Nov. 28, 2007).
628 This case involved the State’s failure to investigate and adjudicate the enforced disappearance of a young indigenous woman and her
child during Guatemala’s internal armed conflict, rather than indigenous land rights.
629
Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶ 97.
630 Id. ¶ 99.
631 Id.
632 Id.
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used to guide the Inter-American System in specifying the types of positive measures that might be required to
give effect to the right to access justice in environmental matters.
7.

Conclusion

In sum, both the Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System recognize the right to access justice. By
incorporating provisions of the Escazú Agreement in their arguments before the institutions of the Inter-American
System, advocates litigating cases of environmental harm can deepen existing protections of the right to access
justice in relation to the environment, particularly on issues of effectiveness, timeliness, and affordability of
environmental justice mechanisms, including for vulnerable groups.

V. Special Protections for Vulnerable Persons and Human Rights Defenders

A. The Escazú Agreement and the Inter-American System Recognize Heightened Protections
for Vulnerable Groups and Human Rights Defenders
In recognition of the particular vulnerability of certain groups to human rights violations and their negative effects,
both the Inter-American System and the Escazú Agreement place additional obligations on States to provide
heightened protection to these groups.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Escazú Agreement to the protection of environmental rights in
the Americas is its recognition of State obligations to protect groups that are placed in a situation of vulnerability
as result of environmental harm and its strong protections for environmental human rights defenders. The treaty
weaves these heightened protections throughout its substantive provisions, continually emphasizing that States
must take affirmative actions to protect vulnerable groups and human rights defenders. ECLAC and UNHCHR
leadership have referred to the protection of human rights defenders as the fourth pillar of the Escazú
Agreement.633
This section provides an overview of these special protections under both the normative framework of the InterAmerican System and the text of the Escazú Agreement. It also offers an in-depth analysis of the specific norms
relevant to human rights defenders, as an example of how these special protections apply to a vulnerable group
and in recognition of their centrality to the protection of environmental human rights.
1. The Escazú Agreement Recognizes Additional Protections for Vulnerable Groups
in Case of Environmental Harm
Within the Inter-American System, the concept that States owe a heightened duty of protection to vulnerable
groups, who are thereby entitled to special protections, is well established. This concept is grounded in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the nature of State obligations relating to the principle of non discrimination recognized in Article 1.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.634 In this regard, the
Court has held that Article 1.1 requires “that States offer effective protection that considers the particularities,
633

ECLAC Reaffirming the Escazú Agreement, supra note 12.
See Case of Baldeón García v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, ¶ 81 (Apr. 6, 2006); Case of
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 154 (Mar.
29, 2006); Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-A. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 111; Case of Furlan and Family members
v. Argentina, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 134; Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (sec. C) No. 245, ¶ 244; Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 202, ¶ 37.
634
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social and economic characteristics, as well as the situation of special vulnerability, customary law, values,
customs, and traditions.”635 The Court has recognized that some groups of people are more vulnerable to harm
than others and held that “any person who is in a vulnerable condition is entitled to special protection, which
must be provided by the States if they are to comply with their general duties to respect and guarantee human
rights.”636
The Court has further held that States must not only “refrain from violating such rights, but also adopt positive
measures, to be determined according to the specific needs of protection of the legal person, either because of
his personal condition or the specific situation he is in[.]” 637 Finally, the Court has acknowledged the
intersectional nature of vulnerability, calling on States to “take into consideration that the groups of persons who
live in adverse conditions and have few resources, such as those who live in extreme poverty, children and
teenagers who are at risk, and indigenous communities” 638 are more likely to face additional vulnerabilities,
including mental disability,639 and must also be protected from discrimination arising from the same. 640
Accordingly, the Court requires that States provide heightened protections for certain groups due to the legal
and factual barriers they face in enjoying and accessing their human rights,641 including economic status, age,
disability, gender, ethnic origin, and social condition, among others.642
In the context of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights relevant to situations of environmental harm,
the Court has analyzed the State obligations arising from these rights as including special protections for
vulnerable groups. In its Advisory Opinion 23 on The Environment and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court
clearly stated that States are directly responsible for protecting the right to a healthy environment of persons or
communities in vulnerable situations.643 The Court specified that vulnerable groups that are especially vulnerable
to environmental damage and therefore should be protected include “indigenous peoples, children, people living
in extreme poverty, minorities, and people with disabilities, [and women], among others…”644 The Court has
further recognized that vulnerable populations that have a close relationship and dependency on traditional lands
and their natural environment “are especially vulnerable to environmental degradation.” 645 Consequently, the
635

Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶
184 (Aug. 31, 2010).
636 Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 103.
637 Id. (citing to the Court’s grounding of this proposition in its analysis of State obligations under Article 1.1 of the American Convention
on Human Rights in the following judgments: Case of Baldeón García v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, ¶ 81; Case of the
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 154; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v.
Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 111). See also Case of Furlan and Family members v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 246, ¶ 134.
638 Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 104.
639 Id.
640 Id. ¶ 105; see also Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 154.
641 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 18, ¶
112.
642 See Estupiñan-Silva, Rosmerlin. La Vulnerabilidad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Esbozo
de una Tipologia. Derechos Humanos y Políticas Públicas, Chapter 5.
643 The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of
the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶¶67-68. (Nov. 15, 2017).
644 Id.
645 The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of
the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation and scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct H.R., supra note 25, at ¶ 67; see also id. at para. 113. In Awas Tingni, the Court found
that indigenous communities have rights to their ancestral land through their collective right to property. Furthermore, indigenous peoples
have an extremely dependent relationship with their natural environment. The Court recognized the need to protect the environment due
to its relationship to human rights, especially in regard to indigenous peoples. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, (Aug. 31, 2001). In Yakye Axa, the Court once again established
that indigenous peoples have close ties to their lands and ecosystem. The Court found that conditions for a decent life include access to
and the quality of water, food, and health as well as environmental protection, going on to state that “these conditions have a major impact
on basic conditions to exercise other human rights.” Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
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Court has held that “States are legally obliged to confront these vulnerabilities based on the principle of equality
and non-discrimination.”646
Both the Commission and the Court have historically recognized persons or groups may be vulnerable based
on identity,647 reliance and relationship to their natural environment,648 work,649 and historical discrimination.650
Groups traditionally recognized as vulnerable include indigenous peoples, 651 tribal peoples or communities of
African descent,652 minorities,653 persons with disabilities,654 LGBTI+ individuals,655 and women.656 Additional
groups recognized by the Court and Commission as vulnerable include children,657 the elderly,658 displaced

C) No. 125, ¶¶ 167, 163. The Court also established that indigenous communities could suffer human rights violations from lack of clean
water, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate access to medical care when prevented from accessing their land – therefore indigenous
communities are heavily interdependent on their ancestral lands and protecting these lands is imperative for both their physical and
cultural survival. Id at ¶¶ 97-98, 131. The Court again recognized the relationship between indigenous peoples and their need for a healthy
environment in Xámok Kásek. In that case, the Court found that when the indigenous community lost access to their land without being
able to participate in the relevant decision-making process, the community was so deprived that it could not survive either physically or
culturally. Xámok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214,
(Aug. 24, 2010).
646 Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 209 (internal citations omitted); See also, The Environment and Human Rights
(State obligations in relation to the environment in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity
– interpretation and scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, InterAm. Ct. H.R., supra note 25, at ¶¶ 67-68.
647 See, e.g., Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards. Inter-American Comm’n H.R.. OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, Doc. 31
(Feb. 12, 2019), at paras. 47-48; Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶¶160, 164, 167-171 (July 8, 2004).
648 See, e.g., Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 209 (internal citations omitted); Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights
over their ancestral lands and natural resources. Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc 56/09, (December 30, 2009), paras. 48-57.
649 See e.g., Case of Bedoya Lima et al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 431, ¶¶ 40, 91, 94
(Aug. 26, 2021); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 2013, Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Chapter III: Violence against
Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American Standards and National Practices on Prevention, Protection and Prosecution of
Perpetrators, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.149, Doc. 50, ¶¶ 355-477 (Dec. 31, 2013).
650 See e.g., Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, doc. 31 (Feb. 12,
2019), ¶¶ 47-48; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights of Persons of African Descent, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc. 109, ¶¶ 1-2 (Mar. 16, 2021).
651 See e.g., id. ¶¶ 78-79; Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights over their ancestral lands and natural resources. Norms and Jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Human Rights System, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09, ¶¶ 48-57 (Dec. 30, 2009).
652 Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights of Persons of African Descent, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc.
109, ¶¶ 16-9 (Mar. 16, 2021).
653 See, e.g., Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, doc. 31, ¶¶ 4748 (Feb. 12, 2019); Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25 ¶ 67.
654 Furlan and Family v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 134; Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
149, ¶ 103; Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, doc. 31, ¶¶ 13940 (Feb. 12, 2019).
655 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25 ¶¶ 78-79; Recognition of the Rights of LGBTI Persons, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170, doc. 184 rev, ¶ 39 (Dec. 7, 2018); Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, doc. 31, ¶¶ 87-88 (Feb. 12, 2019).
656Id. ¶¶ 70-73.
657 See, e.g., Gomez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶¶ 124, 160, 164, 167-171; Case of the "Street
Children" (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶¶ 144-146; Bulacio vs. Argentina. Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 138 (Sep. 18, 2003); Furlan and Family v. Argentina,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 126; Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Childhood, freedom of expression, and the
media in the Americas, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/V/II CIDH/RELE/INF.23/19, ¶¶ 28-39 (Feb. 2019).
658 Equality and Non-Discrimination, Inter-American Standards, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/ V/II.171, doc. 31, ¶¶ 98-100 (Feb.
12, 2019).
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persons and other migrants,659 persons deprived of liberty,660 persons living in extreme poverty,661 and human
rights defenders.662 More recently, Court has also observed that, in relation to the right to a healthy environment,
some “groups [] are especially vulnerable to environmental damage,” and may experience resulting human rights
violations “with greater intensity[,]” indicating an increased recognition of the ways that environmental harm can
place individuals or communities in a situation of vulnerability.663
2. The Escazú Agreement Creates Additional Protections for Vulnerable Groups in
Cases of Environmental Harm
This recognition that environmental harm may place people in a situation of vulnerability requiring heightened
protection is reflected in the approach taken by the Escazú Agreement. The Escazú Agreement applies a more
flexible, intersectional approach to this concept of applying heightened protections to vulnerable groups by
expanding these protections to extend not only to historically marginalized groups but to all groups in a situation
of vulnerability as a result of environmental harm. 664
Article 2 defines “Persons or groups in vulnerable situations” as: “those persons or groups that face particular
difficulties in fully exercising the access rights recognized in the present Agreement, because of circumstances
or conditions identified within each Party’s national context and in accordance with its international
obligations.”665 By defining vulnerability in terms of individual situations while still covering the historically
marginalized groups described above, the Escazú Agreement may be used to apply special protections to a
broader range of groups than previously recognized within the Inter-American System.
Article 4 of the Escazú Agreement asserts that States should ensure guidance and assistance is particularly
provided to “those persons or groups in vulnerable situations” so that they may fully exercise their rights under
the treaty,666 and various other provisions provide specific guidance in this regard. 667 Accordingly, in cases
involving either historically vulnerable groups or those rendered vulnerable to access rights violations as a result
of environmental harm, the Escazú Agreement can be invoked to support the claim that States must apply
heightened protections to these groups, as well as to suggest specific steps that States must take in doing so.
3. The Escazú Agreement Strengthens Existing Protections for Human Rights
Defenders in the Inter-American System
The Escazú Agreement is the first regional human rights treaty to include specific provisions requiring States to
protect and promote the work of human rights defenders.668 The States negotiating the treaty included this
provision because of the increasing volume and intensity of attacks against human rights defenders in Latin
659

See, e.g., Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 18 ¶¶ 112-113; Due Process in Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status
and Statelessness and the Granting of Complementary Protection, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser. L/V/II. doc. 255, ¶ 94 (Aug. 5,
2020).
660 See, e.g., Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, ¶ 87 (Nov. 27, 2003); Principles and Best
Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131, doc. 26 (Mar.
14, 2008).
661 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 67.
662 Case of Digna Ochoa et al. v. México, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 447, ¶¶ 100-101; Case of Luna López v. Honduras, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶¶ 122-23.
663 Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 25 at ¶ 67; see also Nuestra Tierra, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400, ¶ 209 (internal citations
omitted).
664 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2(e).
665 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2(e).
666
Id. at art. 4(5).
667
See, e.g., Id. at arts. 5.3, 5.4, 5.17, 6.6, 7.14, 8.5, and 10.2(e).
668 Id. at Preface, art. 4(6), art. 9; see also Secretary General’s message marking the Entry into Force of the Escazú Agreement, U.N.
April 22, 2021, available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2021-04-22/secretary-generals-message-marking-the-entryforce-of-the-escaz%C3%BA-agreement.
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America and the Caribbean, particularly following the 2016 murder of indigenous environmental human rights
defender Berta Cáceres.669 Human rights defenders, particularly those working to defend human rights related
to the environment670 face a disproportionately and increasingly high risk of attacks, killings,671 threats, and other
acts of repression against their work in the Americas. 672 States frequently criminalize the work of human rights
defenders.673 As a result, human rights defenders constitute a vulnerable group due to the threats they face for
their work.
As noted above, the Inter-American Commission and Court have already recognized this situation and the
special protections owed to human rights defenders by States, but the explicit protections provided under the
Escazú Agreement make clear that States must take affirmative measures to “guarantee an enabling
environment”674 to protect and promote the work of environmental human rights defenders in exercising their
environmental access rights and those of the individuals and communities they serve. Accordingly, as the InterAmerican Commission noted in its recent resolution on environmental human rights defenders, “the Escazú
Agreement is a milestone, because it stresses protection for defenders and their role: its spirit reminds us that,
to protect the environment, we need to start by protecting the people who defend it.” 675 This section offers some
arguments that advocates can present before the Inter-American System to begin to fulfill this promise.

4. Environmental Defenders Are Human Rights Defenders Entitled to Special
Protections
The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders defines human rights defenders as “all
persons, who individually or in association with others, act to promote or protect human rights peacefully,”676 and
environmental human rights defenders as “individuals and groups who, in their personal or professional capacity
and in a peaceful manner, strive to protect and promote human rights relating to the environment, including
water, air, land, flora, and fauna.”677 The Inter-American Court has held that the status of a human rights
defender is not defined by whether they are a private citizen or a public servant but by the work they do. 678 This

Kendrick Foster, Protecting Latin America’s Environmental Defenders: The Fight for the Agreement, Harvard International Review,
(Aug. 25, 2021), available at https://hir.harvard.edu/protecting-latin-americas-environmental-defenders-the-fight-for-the-escazuagreement/;
Front
Line
Defenders,
Global
Analysis
2021,
28
(Feb.
23,
2022),
available
at
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf; see also Sarah Dávila A., The Escazú Agreement:
The Last Piece of the Tripart Normative Framework in the Right to a Healthy Environment, 42 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 3 (Forthcoming), at pp.
38-40.
670 Recognizing the contribution of environmental human rights defenders to the enjoyment of human rights, environmental protection
and sustainable development, U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/40/L.22/Rev.1 at ¶ 1 (Mar. 20, 2019); Human rights
defenders & business in 2021: Protecting the rights of people driving a just transition, Business & Human Rights Resource Center (Apr.
05, 2022), available at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/hrds-2021/; Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis
2020 (Feb. 9, 2021), available at https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/fld_global_analysis_2020.pdf
671
Front
Line
Defenders,
Global
Analysis
2021,
30
(Feb.
23,
2022),
available
at
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf.
672
Global
Witness,
Defending
Tomorrow,
9
(Jul.
05,
2020),
available
at
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/19938/Defending_Tomorrow_EN_high_res_-_July_2020.pdf.
673 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, para 74, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.
49/15 (Dec. 31, 2015).
674 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 4(6).
675
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, About the mandate, Retrieved from:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/srhrdefendersindex.aspx.
676 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Report on the situation of human
rights defenders (Environmental human rights defenders), ¶ 7, Report A/71/281 (Aug. 03, 2016) [hereinafter Report A/71/281].
677
Case of Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 283, ¶ 129 (Aug. 28, 2014). The UN takes the same approach. See, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human
Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights, Factsheet No. 29, at 6-8 (Apr. 2004).
678 In the Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, the Court found that Jeannette Kawas-Fernández was an environmental human rights
defender due to her engagement in “the conservation of the environment and natural resources.” (Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras,
669
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work includes activities such as monitoring, reporting and educating about human rights.679 The Court has also
recognized that the work of environmental defenders is human rights work that entitles them to the same
heightened protections as other human rights defenders.680
States have the obligation to respect, protect, and guarantee the rights of human rights defenders. International
human rights law recognizes the right to defend rights. 681 As the Inter-American Commission has noted,
defenders serve as a crucial backbone to every democratic society, since they "contribute to the improvement
of social, political and economic conditions, the reduction of social and political tensions, the building of peace,
domestically and internationally, and the nurturing of national and international awareness of human rights."682
The Court has deepened this understanding, recognizing “that the activities of monitoring, denunciation and
education that human rights defenders perform make an essential contribution to respect for human rights,
because they act as guarantors against impunity.”683
To guide States in applying existing norms to the situation of human rights defenders, the United Nations adopted
the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in 1998. 684 According to the Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders, States have a special obligation to respect, protect, and guarantee human rights defenders’ rights. 685
To protect defenders’ rights, States need to actively prevent violations, 686 including those committed by nonState actors, such as corporations. 687 States guarantee the rights of human rights defenders by adopting positive
measures like implementing domestic laws, both to protect defenders and to create an enabling environment for
the defense of rights.688 While the Declaration is not binding, it provides an authoritative interpretation on the
application of existing human rights standards to the specific situation of human rights defenders; a broad civil
society coalition is currently working towards adoption of a binding international human rights treaty on the rights
of human rights defenders, known as the Esperanza Protocol.689
The Escazú Agreement holds a special place in the protection of human rights defenders for its clear, broad,
and proactive language requiring States to protect and promote their work in the context of environmental
protection. Specifically, in its preamble, the treaty acknowledges the important contributions of human rights
defenders, “[r]ecognizing the important work . . . of human rights defenders in environmental matters for
strengthening democracy, access rights and sustainable development and their fundamental contributions in this

Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶ 19 (Apr. 3, 2009); see also, Human Rights Defender et al. v.
Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 283, ¶ 129; Case of Luna López v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶ 122).
679 Case of Luna López v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶ 123; Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶ 147.
680 Case of Luna López v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶ 123; Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct.
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Commentary on the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
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regard[.]”690 Under Article 4, which outlines the general obligations of States Parties, the treaty charges States
with the obligation to affirmatively “guarantee an enabling environment for the work of persons, associations,
organizations or groups that promote environmental protection, by recognizing and protecting them.” 691 Not only
does this language provide States with a clear mandate to protect the work of environmental defenders and
ensure that they are encouraged to carry it out, but it offers a strategically broad definition of the individuals and
groups that enjoy such protection.
Finally, the treaty devotes an entire article, Article 9, to a non-exclusive list of the specific protections due to
environmental defenders, incorporating again that broad definition of those eligible for these heightened
protections692 while explicitly referencing existing State obligations towards human rights defenders under
international human rights law.693 Article 9 also strongly restates existing Inter-American human rights standards
obliging States to respond in an “appropriate, effective and timely” manner to any threats or attacks against
human rights defenders while exercising their rights under the treaty.694
In the First Conference of the Parties to the Escazú Agreement, the States parties reaffirmed the urgency of
implementing the treaty’s strong protections for human rights defenders in environmental matters. In Decision
I/6, the parties “stress[ed] the importance of the work of human rights defenders in environmental matters[]” and
“reaffirm[ed] the critical importance of guaranteeing an enabling environment for the work of [those who] promote
environmental protection, by recognizing and protecting them[.]”695
5. Latin American Environmental Human Rights Defenders are Particularly Vulnerable
In their role of promoting human rights and advocating against violations, human rights defenders often become
targets themselves.696 They experience grave human rights violations in retribution for their work, such as killings,
physical attacks, intimidation, and criminalization.697 Environmental defenders face particularly high risks; for
example, recent data from the Business and Human Rights Resource Center shows that nearly 70% of attacks
against human rights defenders in 2021 were against climate, land, and environmental defenders. 698 Likewise,
Latin American human rights defenders face disproportionately high risks; 699 in the last several years, the region
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693 Id. at art. 9(2).
694 Id. at art. 9(3). Case of Digna Ochoa et al. v. México. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
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696 U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Report on the situation of human rights
defenders (Environmental human rights defenders). Report A/71/281, para. 26 (Aug. 03. 2016).
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has been home to the highest proportion of all global targeted killings of activists, and in 2021, 70% occurred in
the Americas.700
As noted above, the Escazú Agreement’s strong protections for environmental defenders were drafted in
recognition of this regional context, highlighting the urgency of strategic and effective litigation and advocacy to
achieve implementation of these standards.
6. The Escazú Agreement Can Build on Existing Inter-American Protections for
Environmental Defenders
Because the Escazú Agreement defines environmental defenders broadly and places clear, proactive obligations
on States to protect and promote their work through the creation of a safe, enabling environment, it can be an
essential tool to broaden protections for environmental defenders in the Americas. Combined with existing
protections for human rights defenders within the Inter-American System, the Escazú Agreement can strengthen
and broaden these standards while providing the Inter-American Commission and Court with the normative
foundation to push States to take more concrete and effective steps towards meaningful protection of
environmental defenders under threat.
As noted above, the Escazú Agreement acknowledges the important contributions of human rights defenders
and includes binding obligations requiring States to establish safe working conditions for them.701
Specifically, Article 9 states that “[e]ach Party shall guarantee a safe and enabling environment for persons,
groups, and organizations that promote and defend human rights in environmental matters so that they are able
to act free from threat, restriction and insecurity.”702 Article 9.2 emphasizes States’ duty to recognize, protect,
and promote all rights of environmental human rights defenders.703 Additionally, Article 9.3 stresses States’ duty
to prevent attacks and threats against defenders, as well the duty to investigate and provide remedies for
previous attacks.704
With its strong focus on human rights defenders, the Escazú Agreement may be used to deepen existing
protections within the Inter-American System through strategic litigation and advocacy.
7.

Existing Inter-American Protections Complement the Contributions of the Escazú
Agreement

As noted above, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has emphasized the importance of State obligations
to protect human rights defenders in a way that complements the relevant provisions of the Escazú Agreement
and provides normative content and guidance for implementing these essential protections for environmental
defenders. 705 Specifically,
the Court has indicated that States have the duty to ensure that [human rights defenders]
can carry out their activities freely; to protect them when they are subject to threats in order
to avoid attacks on their life and integrity; to refrain from imposing obstacles that hinder
700
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their work, and to investigate, seriously and effectively, any violations committed against
them, combatting impunity. Moreover, in cases of attacks against human rights defenders,
States have the obligation to ensure impartial, prompt and authoritative justice and this
entails an exhaustive search for all the information in order to design and execute an
investigation that involves the proper analysis of the different hypotheses of authorship, by
act or omission, at different levels, exploring all the pertinent lines of investigation to identify
those responsible.706

In the Luna Lopez v. Honduras case, the Court emphasized the need for States to take concrete steps to protect
human rights defenders, ordering Honduras to adopt a new public policy that aims to reduce the risk and protect
the rights of defenders.707 The Court supported the recommendations of an expert who testified in the case,
adopting his view that “a public policy for the protection of human rights defenders, including defenders of the
environment, should at least take into account the following requirements:
a) The participation of human rights defenders, civil society organizations, and experts in
the formulation of the standards that could regulate protection for the collective in question;
b) The protection program should address the problem in a comprehensive and interinstitutional manner, according to the risk of each situation; and adopt measures to
immediately address the complaints made by defenders;
c) The creation of a risk analysis model that allows for the effective assessment of the risk
and protection needs of each defender or group;
d) The creation of an information management system for the situation of prevention and
protection of human rights defenders;
e) The design of protection plans that respond to the specific risk faced by each defender
and the characteristics of their work;
f) The promotion of a culture that legitimates and protects the work of human rights
defenders, and
g) The allocation of sufficient human and financial resources to respond to the real needs
for the protection of human rights defenders.” 708

In addition to this detailed guidance, the Inter-American system’s intersectional approach to the heightened
protections due to vulnerable groups, including human rights defenders, is a rich source of normative
development that can deepen the Escazú Agreement’s protections for environmental defenders by giving shape
to the treaty’s acknowledgement that States must provide additional protections to vulnerable groups. For
example, the Inter-American Court has consistently recognized that in addressing attacks against female human
rights defenders, States need to analyze the risks of gender-based violence against female defenders by
identifying and investigating aspects that put female defenders in heightened danger.709 Specifically, in the Digna
Ochoa v. Mexico case, the Court held that “[i]n the case of attacks against women human rights defenders, the
Court considers that all the measures designed to mitigate the risks they run should be adopted with a gender
perspective and with an intersectional approach, so that these women can be provided with comprehensive
protection based on considering, understanding and highlighting the complexities of the different forms of
violence that women defenders face due to their profession and their gender.” 710 The Court’s jurisprudence in
this regard can guide States Parties to the Escazú Agreement to apply an intersectional approach to upholding
the rights of environmental defenders who are also members of additional vulnerable groups.
706
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B. Existing Inter-American Standards Complement the Application of the Escazú Agreement’s Three
Pillars to Human Rights Defenders
Together with the specific protections articulated in Article 9 of the Escazú Agreement, the three main pillars of
the treaty play a crucial role in protecting human rights defenders. The treaty incorporates this fact into Article
9, explicitly obligating each State Party to “take adequate and effective measures to recognize, protect and
promote . . . the rights of human rights defenders in environmental matters, including . . . their ability to exercise
their access rights, taking into account its international obligations in the field of human rights[.]” 711 Under this
provision, the treaty not only requires States to ensure that environmental defenders can exercise their access
rights, but it explicitly directs them to do so in conformity with their existing human rights obligations. Existing
Inter-American standards provide the normative content that the treaty directs States to apply to these
specialized protections, and the Inter-American Court already regularly engages in the type of analysis invited
by this provision. By bringing arguments that combine existing Inter-American standards with these
complementary protections under the Escazú Agreement, advocates can sharpen the Inter-American System’s
focus on defining and enforcing State obligations with regard to environmental defenders and promote more
rapid implementation of these protections.
1. Pillar One: Environmental Defenders’ Rights to Environmental Information
With regard to the first pillar, the right to access to environmental information, the Escazú Agreement provides
strong safeguards to ensure access to information regarding environmental matters. Access to information, both
in the sense of being able to obtain relevant information and in the sense of having the right to share such
information, is crucial to the work of environmental defenders. In addition to the general requirement in Article
9.2 that States Parties protect “all of the rights of environmental defenders [], including their right to . . . freedom
of opinion and expression, . . . as well as their ability to exercise their access rights,” 712 the treaty provides specific
protections of the right to access information that are relevant to human rights defenders. In Article 5.1, the
Escazú Agreement states that “[e]ach Party shall ensure the public’s right of access to environmental information
in its possession, control or custody, in accordance with the principle of maximum disclosure.” 713 Article 6.1
further states that “[e]ach Party shall guarantee . . . that the competent authorities generate, collect, publicize
and disseminate environmental information[.]”714 However, the treaty does not address the obligation to allow
private individuals to disseminate information, aside from a provision noting that State authorities should try to
prevent any restrictions being placed on the use or reproduction of environmental information. 715
The right to information generally derives from the broad principle of freedom of expression, and, as the official
Commentary on the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states, “[f]reedom of expression is one of the
rights crucial to the work of human rights defenders.” 716 Article 6 of the Declaration establishes the right to
information.717 This provision includes the rights to “know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information[.]”718
Additionally, to ensure the effectiveness of the right to information, the Declaration entails the rights to “study,
discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms[.]”719 The Declaration also protects the right to freely publish information.720
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These various facets of the right to information are well-established in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court and takes on special relevance in cases involving journalists and, by extension, human rights defenders.721
For example, in the Vélez Restrepo case, the Court held that the right to freedom of thought and expression as
enshrined in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights “protects the right to seek, to receive and
to impart ideas and information of all kinds, as well as to receive and to obtain the information and ideas
disseminated by others.”722 In the situation of journalists collecting and disseminating information of public
interest, States may not prevent or hinder such activities without committing a serious violation of the right to
freedom of expression that has “intimidating effect on the free flow of information[]” 723 and affects “one of the
basic conditions of a democratic society[.]” 724 As a result, “any measure that interferes with the journalistic
activities of people playing this role will inevitably obstruct the right to freedom of expression in its individual and
collective dimensions.”725 These pronouncements from the Inter-American Court can be applied to the specific
context of violations of the right to access to information against environmental defenders in combination with
the provisions of the Escazú Agreement explicitly protecting this aspect of their work.
The Court’s recent judgment in the Case of Bedoya Lima et al. v. Colombia is particularly relevant in illustrating
the Inter-American System’s intersectional approach to these types of violations. Ms. Bedoya was a journalist
who was kidnapped and subjected to physical, sexual, and verbal assault.726 The Court found that Ms. Bedoya
was subjected to this violence because she was a journalist, and that such violence was “intended to punish,
intimidate, and silence her.”727 The Court emphasized that journalists, especially female ones, were specifically
more vulnerable to violence aimed at silencing them.728 The Court also emphasized that States have an
obligation to protect the right to freedom of expression of vulnerable persons, in particular women, whose point
of view provides valuable information to society and is essential to democracy. 729 As such, States have a
responsibility to protect the right to information of vulnerable persons and groups, but also to protect them for
their role in disseminating information critical to the protection of human rights.
The right to disseminate information also relates to the troubling trend of State criminalization of human rights
defenders, particularly in the case of defamation or other charges aimed at chilling speech critical of State
activities.730 The Inter-American Commission has found that efforts by States to criminalize human rights
defenders can directly undermine the rights to access to information and to participation by hindering not only
the specific defender in question from exercising their rights, but by “generat[ing] community division, because
when a defender is criminalized, it often generates mistrust and collective insecurity, as well as a climate of fear,
threats, accusations, and social ostracism.”731 The Commission has also noted that speech critical of the State
is subject to special protections under Article 13 of the American Convention and that the Commission and Court
will accordingly apply a strict version of the necessity test when evaluating the Conventionality of criminal
721
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restrictions on such speech.732 In the Lysias-Fleury case, the Inter-American Court held that human rights
defenders have the right to be free from criminalization, noting with concern that States arrest and detain HRDs,
not to press charges, but rather to use “threats against and harassment of human rights defenders, to intimidate
[them] and dissuade [them] from carrying out [their] work.”733
In order to specifically safeguard the participation of human rights defenders, Articles 9.1 and 9.2 of the Escazú
Agreement reiterates defenders’ rights to live free from restrictions, move freely, assemble and associate
peacefully, and freely express themselves; these provisions can be jointly read as protecting defenders from
criminalization.734 Furthermore Article 4.6 obligates States to “guarantee an enabling environment for the work
of persons, associations, organizations or groups that promote environmental protection, by recognizing and
protecting them.”735 The Escazú Agreement’s express protection of human rights defenders’ right to access to
justice can also be interpreted as a counterweight to the ways in which criminalization of defenders weaponizes
legal mechanisms to prevent defenders from protecting human rights. 736 These provisions pair with the InterAmerican System’s critical analysis of criminalization to provide a clear protection for environmental defenders
against this practice that can be raised in future cases.
2. Pillar Two: Environmental Defenders’ Right to Public Participation in Environmental
Decision-Making Process
The second pillar of the Escazú Agreement protects the right to public participation in the environmental decisionmaking process, another crucial access right for environmental defenders. As noted previously, Article 9.2
emphasizes the application of this right to human rights defenders, requiring that States Parties protect “all of
the rights of environmental defenders [], including their right to . . . peaceful assembly and association, . . . as
well as their ability to exercise their access rights,”737 and the treaty also contains specific protections of the right
to participation that are pertinent to human rights defenders. Specifically, Article 7 provides detailed protections,
requiring “[e]ach Party [to] ensure the public’s right to participation and, for that purpose, commit[] to implement
open and inclusive participation in environmental decision-making processes based on domestic and
international normative frameworks.”738 States Parties must also “guarantee mechanisms for the participation of
the public in decision-making processes . . . that have or may have a significant impact on the environment,”739
among other related obligations.
The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders reinforces the bedrock principle of non-discriminatory
participation by ensuring that “[e]veryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to have
effective access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to participation in the government of his or her country and in
the conduct of public affairs.”740 Most pertinent to the activities of environmental defenders, the Declaration
specifies that “[t]his includes, inter alia, the right, individually and in association with others, to submit to
government bodies and agencies concerned with public affairs criticism and proposals for improving their
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Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶153 (Apr. 3 2009).
734 Escazú Agreement, supra note 1 at art. 9(1)-(2).
735 Id. at art. 4(6).
736 Id. at art. 9(3).
737 Id. at art. 9(2).
738
Id. at art. 7(1).
739
Escazú Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7(2).
740 U.N. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8.1, G.A. Res. A/RES/53/144 (Dec. 09, 1998). [hereinafter Res.
A/RES/53/144].
732

73
Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System

Escazú Toolkit: Using the Escazú Agreement in Cases Before the Inter-American System
functioning and to draw attention to any aspect of their work that may hinder or impede the promotion, protection
and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”741
In the Inter-American System, the right to participation has been grounded in Article 16.1 (right to freedom of
association) and Article 23 (right to participate in government) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 742
In the Escaleras Mejia case, the Inter-American Court interpreted these articles in light of Article 8 of the UN
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders to find that threats and attacks against an environmental defender
violated his right to participation.743 The Court also found that these threats and attacks affected not only Mr.
Escalera Mejia’s rights to freedom of association and participation, but also had a chilling effect on other
environmental defenders, compounding the violation. 744 The Court further observed that intimidating human
rights defenders impacts not only the defender’s ability to carry out their human rights work, but also the
community and society as a whole.745
In the Kawas Fernandez case, the Court analyzed the murder of an environmental defender as a violation of
Article 16, finding that the attack against her was “motivated by [her] work in defense of the environment[,]” and
“that her death, evidently, resulted in the deprivation of her right to associate freely with others.” 746 Because, as
the Court acknowledged, “these circumstances have also had an intimidating effect on other people who are
engaged in the defense of the environment[,]”747 the Court found that “[g]iven the important role of human rights
defenders in democratic societies,” to guarantee the right to participate in non-governmental organizations or
other groups monitoring human rights, States must “create the legal and factual conditions for [defenders] to be
able to freely perform their task.”748
The Court made similar pronouncements in the Lysias Fleury case.749 In that case, the Court further held that
where threats or attacks against a human rights defender are made in relation to the defender’s work in defense
of human rights and therefore prevent the defender from “exercising freedom of association with the organization
for which he worked[,]”750 the State fails in its obligation to guarantee the right to freedom of association under
Article 16 of the American Convention.
By raising the specialized right to participation protections of the Escazú Agreement in cases involving human
rights defenders before the Inter-American System, advocates can push the Commission and Court towards
understanding how acts that block defenders’ access to specific aspects of the public participation and
consultation process feed into this broader context acknowledged by the Court in these cases.
3. Pillar Three: Environmental Defenders’ Right to Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters
In its third pillar, the Escazú Agreement protects the right to access to justice in environmental matters. In light
of widespread impunity throughout the region for attacks against human rights defenders, this right has particular
importance for environmental defenders under threat. In Article 8.1, the Escazú Agreement states that “[e]ach
Party shall guarantee the right of access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the guarantees
741 Id.

at art. 4.2.
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found that every individual defending human rights related to the environment has the right to special protection by the State with particular
regard to the right to life.
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Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶ 152 (April, 3, 2009).
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Id. ¶ 153.
748 Id. ¶ 146.
749 Id. ¶ 100.
750 Case of Lysias Fleury et al. v. Haiti. Merits and Reparations. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 236, ¶ 101-102. (Nov. 23, 2011).
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of due process.”751 The treaty explicitly applies this protection to human rights defenders in Article 9.2, requiring
that States Parties protect “all of the rights of environmental defenders . . . including . . . their ability to exercise
their access rights[.]”752 It also extends this obligation to more traditional human rights violations against
defenders when it reiterates the States’ duty to take “appropriate, effective and timely measures to prevent,
investigate and punish attacks, threats or intimidations” against environmental defenders in Article 9.3.753
The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders also recognizes the right to access to justice, stating that
defenders “have the right, individually and association with others, to benefit from an effective remedy and to be
protected in the event of the violation of those rights.” 754 Article 9.2 of the Declaration establishes the right “to
complain to and have that complaint promptly reviewed in a public hearing before an independent, impartial and
competent judicial or other authority[.]”755 Pursuant to Article 9.5, “[t]he State shall conduct a prompt and impartial
investigation or ensure that an inquiry takes place whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms has occurred in any territory under its jurisdiction.”756 As interpreted
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, “the obligation to provide human rights
defenders with an effective remedy entails that the State ensures, without undue delay, a prompt and impartial
investigation into the alleged violations, the prosecution of the perpetrators regardless of their status, the
provision of redress, including appropriate compensation to victims, as well as the enforcement of the decisions
or judgments.”757 If States do not comply with this duty, the lack of an effective remedy constitutes an additional
violation and leaves the defender vulnerable to additional threats. 758
The Inter-American System has developed strong jurisprudence around the right to access to justice under
Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and its organs have begun to apply these
standards to the situation of human rights defenders. 759 In a recent report, the Inter-American Commission
emphasized the importance of protecting this right for defenders, noting that “the most effective way to protect
human rights defenders is by effectively investigating the acts of violence against them, and punishing the
persons responsible[.]”760 The Court has repeatedly underscored this obligation, noting that impunity for attacks
against human rights defenders exacerbates and reinforces the chilling effect of such attacks on other
defenders.761
In the case of Lysias Fleury et al. v. Haiti, the Court held that States must “investigate seriously and effectively
the violations committed against [defenders], in order to combat impunity.” 762 In determining that Haiti violated
Mr. Fleury’s right to access to justice by allowing a security force attack against him for his work as a human
rights defender to remain in impunity, the Court underscored that “the State is obliged to provide effective judicial
remedies to those who allege that they are victims of human rights violations[,]” and “to investigate, prosecute,
and, as appropriate, punish human rights violations[.]” 763 In the case of Luna Lopez et al. v. Honduras, where a
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753 Id. art. 9(3).
754 U.N. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9.1, G.A. Res. A/RES/53/144 (Dec. 09, 1998).
755 Id. art. 9.2.
756 Id. art. 9.5.
757 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Commentary on the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility
of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 9.3, G.A. Res. Report A/65/223, ¶ 44 (Jul. 2011).
758 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Human Rights Defenders, Report A/65/223, ¶ 44 (Aug. 04, 2010).
759 For further discussion on the right to access to justice in the Inter-American System, see Pillar Three, See Section IV(C).
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Basic Guidelines for Investigating Crimes against Human Rights Defenders in the Northern Triangle, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. doc.110/21 ¶ 31 (Jun. 1, 2021).
761 Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, ¶ 153 (Apr. 3, 2009).
762 Lysias Fleury et al. v. Haiti. ¶ 81. (Nov. 23, 2011).
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local politician and environmental defender was threatened and eventually murdered for his work, 764 the InterAmerican Court held that States have the obligation to conduct a proper investigation when crimes against
human rights defenders occur and provide effective judicial remedies for victims of human rights violations. 765
In the Escaleras Mejia case, the Court made the clear pronouncement that the State must take the victim’s status
as a human rights defender into account when conducting the investigation to assure meaningful access to
justice in cases of attacks against human rights defenders. Specifically, the Court held that:
In cases of attacks against human rights defenders, States have the obligation to ensure
access to justice that is impartial, timely, and formal, which implies an exhaustive search
for all of the information to design and carry out an investigation that leads to the due
analysis of the question of who committed the act, through action or omission, at different
levels, exploring all of the pertinent investigative lines to identify those
responsible. Consequently, when faced with indications or allegations that a particular act
against a human rights defender could have been motivated by his or her work to promote
and defend human rights, the investigating authorities must take into account the context
of the facts and the defender’s activities to identify the interests that may have been
affected in the exercise of the same, in order to establish and exhaust the lines of
investigation that take into account the defender’s work, determine the theory of the crime,
and identify the perpetrators. 766

Finally, the Court again reiterated its intersectional approach to the right to access to justice for women human
rights defenders in the Digna Ochoa case, where it pronounced that:
in order to ensure effective access to justice on an equal basis for women human rights
defenders, . . . States must guarantee (i) unrestricted access, without gender-based
discrimination, to justice, ensuring that women human rights defenders receive effective
protection against harassment, threats, reprisals and violence; (ii) a system of justice that
is in keeping with international standards concerning competence, efficiency,
independence, impartiality, integrity and credibility, and the diligent and prompt
investigation of acts of violence, as well as (iii) the application, in the context of this access
to justice for women human rights defenders, of mechanisms that ensure that the
evidentiary standards, investigations and other legal probative procedures are impartial
and are not influenced by gender stereotyping or prejudices.767

These clear standards on the application of the right to access to justice to the specific situation of human rights
defenders complement the specialized protections in the Escazú Agreement. Raising these standards together
in future cases will strengthen Inter-American standards on the rights of human rights defenders and promote
more effective implementation of this aspect of the new treaty.
4. The Inter-American System and the Escazú Agreement Recognize that Human
Rights Defenders Cannot Exercise their Rights When Subject to Threats and
Attacks
Underlying all of the standards outlined above is the shared understanding between the Inter-American System
and the Escazú Agreement that human rights defenders cannot exercise their rights – including their
764

Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶¶ 24-46, 191.
Id. ¶¶ 153-59.
766 Case of Escaleras Mejía et al. v. Honduras. Judgment of September 26, 2018. Series C No. 361, at para. 47 (internal citations omitted)
(unofficial translation); see also id. at para. 54 (citing Human Rights Defender v. Guatemala, para. 142, and Case of the Xucuru
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environmental access rights – when they are subject to threats, criminalization, attacks, and killings intended to
silence their activism. Under the Escazú Agreement, Article 9 clearly acknowledges that defenders can only
exercise their rights in a “safe and enabling environment . . . free from threat, restriction and insecurity.” 768
Current Inter-American standards complement and give content to this shared understanding, inviting arguments
that combine both in cases involving environmental defenders.
In several cases relating to human rights defenders, as discussed previously, the Court has found that States
must create a safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders to “conduct their activities freely,”
including by protecting them from threats, investigating any violations committed against them, and refraining
from imposing restrictions that impede their work.769 The Court has also reiterated that this special protection is
necessary because “the defense of human rights can be exercised freely only when the persons engaged in it
are not victims of any threats or any type of physical, psychological or moral aggression, or other forms of
harassment.”770 Accordingly, in Human Rights Defender et al, v. Guatemala, the Court held that “it is the State's
obligation not only to create the legal and formal conditions, but also to ensure the real conditions in which human
rights defenders can freely carry out their work.”771 As a result of these obligations, States also have heightened
duties to guarantee the rights to life and personal integrity of human rights defenders. 772
This recognition is echoed in Article 9.2 of the Escazú Agreement, which charges States Parties with “tak[ing]
adequate and effective measures to recognize, protect and promote all the rights of human rights defenders in
environmental matters, including their right to life [and] personal integrity[.]” 773 Essentially, the treaty
acknowledges that environmental access rights and the rights to life and personal integrity are fundamentally
interrelated when environmental defenders face threats and attacks. Advocates seeking to enforce this provision
can rely upon the Inter-American standards articulated above to raise arguments based in this shared
understanding of the heightened obligations States owe to human rights defenders.
C. Conclusion
The Escazú Agreement offers heightened protections and new possibilities for innovative advocacy and litigation
on behalf of environmental human rights defenders, and other vulnerable groups. Given the threats faced by
environmental defenders in the Americas, the Escazú Agreement is a powerful tool to improve their situation, if
States take meaningful and immediate measures to implement these special protections. Litigation and
advocacy before the Inter-American System that invokes the specialized protections of the Escazú Agreement
to interpret State obligations under Inter-American human right treaties can be a powerful vehicle for promoting
such implementation.
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VI. Selected Substantive Rights: Analyzing the Right to Health in Light of the
Escazú Agreement

A. The Inter-American System and the Escazú Agreement Recognize the Right to Health
Although the Escazú Agreement addresses procedural rather than substantive rights, in the context of
environmental harm and sustainable development, these rights are inherently interdependent and indivisible, as
the Inter-American Court recognized in its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights.774 In the
Advisory Opinion, the Court found that multiple substantive rights were likely to be affected by environmental
degradation, including the rights to life, personal integrity, private life, not to be forcefully displaced, participate
in cultural life, food, water, housing, health, and property.775 Accordingly, this section of the toolkit examines how
the environmental access rights protected by the Escazú Agreement complement the existing Inter-American
normative framework to protect substantive rights that are likely to be affected by environmental harm, looking
specifically at the right to health as an emblematic example.
As the Court has noted in Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights and the subsequent Nuestra
Tierra judgment, “damage to the environment may affect all human rights,” 776 and they must still be analyzed as
separate human rights violations.777 For example, a situation amounting to a violation of the right to a healthy
environment may also encompass a separate violation of a related substantive right, such as the right to
health. It is similarly artificial to expect that environmental access rights violations will not occur in conjunction
with related substantive rights violations. On the contrary, in the context of a human rights case involving
environmental harm, the same set of facts are likely to give rise to violations of both substantive and procedural
rights.
Given this reality, advocates seeking to incorporate arguments based in the Escazú Agreement before the InterAmerican System will need to analyze substantive rights in tandem with related procedural rights. To provide
guidance on how the environmental access protections of the Escazú Agreement map onto substantive rights
likely to be affected by environmental harm, this section examines the specific example of the right to health,
addressing first the existing Inter-American normative framework and then describing how the Escazú
Agreement could be used to complement this understanding.

B. Recognition of Right to a Healthy Environment by the Inter-American System
The right to health is well-recognized in the Inter-American System. It is both an autonomous right and a right
that is associated with other substantive and procedural rights that are affected by acts that harm the
environment.
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As discussed in the section on the right to a healthy environment, above, the Court has asserted its authority to
declare violations of the human right to health by virtue of Article 26 of the American Convention. Although the
right to health is explicitly recognized and protected under Article 7(f) of the San Salvador Protocol in the context
of the right to just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions of work,778 the Court is not authorized to declare
violations of that provision.779 Instead, the Court has declared that the right to health is an autonomous right
implicit in the economic, social, and cultural rights recognized under Article 26 of the American Convention and
is therefore justiciable through Article 26.780 In Poblete Vilches v. Chile, for example, the Court held that States
have an obligation to take adequate, deliberate, and concrete steps toward the full realization of the right to
health and that failure to do so amounts to a violation of Article 26.781
In its Advisory Opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court identified the right to
health as a right that is particularly vulnerable to environmental impact.782 For example, activities that pollute air,
water, soil, and food supplies can result in a violation of the right to health, among others. 783
Therefore, States have a corresponding duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the human right to health in the context
of environmental harms. The duty to respect the right to health requires States to refrain from acts that harm the
environment. For example, the Court has found that a State’s failure to provide water of sufficient quantity and
adequate quality affects human health because it exposes people to the risk of dehydration and disease. 784
Furthermore, a State’s duty to protect the right to health in the context of environmental harm is a positive
obligation that includes the duty to prevent both State agents and third parties from violating the right. 785 Thus,
States can be liable for their failure to regulate and supervise environmental acts that result in violations of the
right to health committed by third parties.786 Finally, States also have a positive obligation to adopt measures
that ensure the fulfillment and enjoyment of the right to health in the context of environmental harm, which
includes the duty to adopt regulatory guidelines that prevent third party interference with the right to health.787
The enjoyment of the right to health, as it relates to environmental harm, also requires States to respect, protect,
and fulfill other related substantive and procedural rights. 788 Substantively, the Court has declared that States
are obligated to refrain from acts of environmental harm that negatively affect the enjoyment of other human
rights and must actively take the necessary measures to ensure access to clean water, food, and adequate
housing, for example, to guarantee the right to health.789 For example, States have a positive obligation to
disseminate information about the protection of water sources, food and water. 790 The Court has also declared
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that the realization of the right to health791 requires States to respect, protect, and fulfill “procedural rights (such
as the rights to freedom of expression and association, to information, to participation in decision-making, and
to an effective remedy).”792

C. Other Persuasive Authorities Recognize the Human Right to Health
In addition to citing the Inter-American sources of law discussed above, advocates litigating environmental harm
cases before the Inter-American System may also want to cite other persuasive sources on the right to health.
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, for example, generally recognizes “the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being” of every person, including medical care.793 The right
to health is also generally recognized in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”)794 and article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 795 Article 7 of the
ICESCR also connects the right to health with the right to just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions of work, by
prohibiting unhealthy working conditions.796
More specifically, according to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, States
must ensure “an adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic sanitation.”797 The Committee has further
clarified that the obligation to fulfill the right to health requires States to formulate and implement national policies
aimed at reducing and “eliminating pollution of air, water, and soil, including pollution by heavy metals.”798
According to the Committee, States must not only avoid engaging in activities that release substances harmful
to human health,799 they must also act to prevent and reduce exposure to harmful substances or other detrimental
environmental conditions that directly or indirectly harm human health.800 Additionally, the Committee has
emphasized that the right to health in the context of environmental harm requires States to also guarantee certain
procedural rights, such as the right to public participation in decisions that could harm the environment, to access
information about how those harms could affect human health, and to access justice and seek an effective
remedy when those environmental harms cause violations of the right to health. 801 Those are precisely the
procedural rights and obligations emphasized in the Escazú Agreement.

D. Recognition of the Human Right to Health by the Escazú Agreement
The Escazú Agreement complements the protections of the right to health that exist under the Inter-American
System by focusing on the obligations of States to ensure public access to information about environmental
harms that may affect the right to health, public participation in environmental matters that may affect the right
to health, and access to justice and judicial remedies when environmental harms have a detrimental effect on
the right to health. In particular, the Escazú Agreement requires States to ensure people have clear information
791
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about the “environmental quality of goods and services and their effects on health.”802 The States’ obligations
under the Escazú Agreement extend to ensuring access to environmental information possessed by private
parties, especially information on “their operations and the possible risks and effects on human health and the
environment.”803
More specifically, Article 7 of the Escazú Agreement obligates States to guarantee “open and inclusive
participation” by creating mechanisms for the public to participate in decisions that may have a significant impact
on the environment, “including when they may affect health.”804 This right to public participation under the Escazú
Agreement includes the opportunity, within reasonable timeframes, to present observations and receive
information regarding the environmental decision-making process.805
In sum, the three-pillar framework of the Escazú Agreement that focuses on the procedural rights to information,
participation, and access to justice in environmental matters complements and reinforces the existing InterAmerican normative framework to protect substantive rights that are likely to be affected by environmental harm,
including the human right to health. Advocates litigating cases of environmental harm before the Inter-American
System that involve potential violations of the human right to health may therefore want to add to their arguments
the procedural rights framework highlighted in the Escazú Agreement.

VII. Conclusion
This toolkit explored how advocates will be able to use the Escazú Agreement for cases before the InterAmerican Commission and Court to strengthen the protection of environmental human rights in the region. This
toolkit is intended to be used as guidance in the crafting of legal arguments through existing norms and
jurisprudence from the Inter-American System and specific provisions from the Escazú Agreement. The Escazú
Agreement was based on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and adopted to protect and promote environmental
access rights protections in the Americas and the Caribbean. As a reminder, the Inter-American System and
ECLAC are not directly related. Cases before the Inter-American Court and Commission must be grounded in
violations of the American Convention and other Inter-American human rights treaties.
This toolkit reflects how the Escazú Agreement strengthens existing human rights protections relating to the right
to a healthy environment and the rights of human rights defenders by focusing on “access rights.” Specifically,
the Escazú Agreement codifies protections in the areas of the right to information, participation, and access to
justice in environmental matters.
The first access right, or pillar as it is referred to in the Escazú Agreement and this toolkit, is the right to
information in relation to environmental matters. As discussed in Pillar I on the right to information, the Escazú
Agreement provides specific guidance on how to ensure the maximum disclosure of environmental information.
This principle complements existing Inter-American normative framework limitations on State restriction of
access to information by imposing an affirmative obligation on States to produce, organize, update, and
disseminate information.
The Escazú Agreement requires that States facilitate a robust system for EIAs, including the social dimension to
EIAs. This robust system is meant to ensure access to information, and maximum participation to indigenous as
well as non-indigenous persons and groups in vulnerable situations. This broader understanding of vulnerability
broadens the scope of protection for non-indigenous persons and groups affected by environmental harm,
especially in their ability to protect their rights to health, personal integrity, life, and others.
802
803
804
805
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In Pillar II, the right to participation, protects the right to have meaningful participation in decision -making
processes. The Escazú Agreement guarantees effective and timely participation in environmental decision making. The agreement provides for minimum categories of necessary information that ensure the effectiveness
of public participation, such as the authorities responsible for making decisions and bodies involved the
participatory processes. Additionally, the Escazú Agreement requires that States make public specific types of
information so that the public can assess the merits, risks, and alternatives to decisions made. Finally, and one
of the most important innovations of the Escazú Agreement is the focus on emphasizing the need to ensure the
participation of vulnerable persons or groups, indigenous peoples, and affected persons in relation to
environmental matters by requiring free, comprehensive information about proposed activities, and their
cumulative environmental impact.
Finally, Pillar III protects access to justice in environmental matters. As discussed in the toolkit, access to justice
ensures that individuals and groups are able to navigate justice systems accessibly and effectively. The Escazú
Agreement can be interpreted to build on existing Inter-American protections, such as the Nuestra Tierra case,
and fill the critical gaps of access to justice in environmental matters. Specifically, the agreement provides
unambiguous obligations for States to provide mechanisms that prevent, halt, mitigate, or rehabilitate
environmental harm. Provisions under the Escazú Agreement broaden the scope of the types of justice
proceedings within the access to justice framework, thus recognizing more types of proceedings that are and
must be accessible for individuals and groups affected by environmental harm as well as the public. Additionally,
the Escazú Agreement provides an important requirement of timeliness. “Timely” access to justice fits within the
Inter-American System framework and can be used to bolster existing protections under the Inter-American
System and expand them to environmental rights cases.
As discussed throughout the toolkit, access rights to information, participation, and access to justice in
environmental matters are inextricably linked to environmental degradation, the right to a healthy environment,
and the protection of vulnerable persons and groups in relation to environmental matters. As such, by
incorporating these Escazú Agreement provisions into legal briefs, advocates litigating cases of environmental
harm before the Inter-American System will help further develop the normative framework for the right to a
healthy environment.
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